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Prejudicial Joinder Under California
Penal Code Section 954: Judicial
Economy at a Premium
Section 954 of the California Penal Code provides that charges of
two or more offenses may be joined in one accusatory pleading
against a criminal defendant if the crimes are of the same class of
crimes or are connected together in their commission.' Section 954
further provides that a trial court may, in its discretion, order that
multiple criminal charges be severed and tried individually, provided
good cause is shown and fairness so necessitates. 2 The state realizes
economic savings when separate offenses are consolidated for a single
trial, but joinder may also greatly prejudice the defendant. 3
Traditionally, cases dealing with section 954 interpreted the broad
language of the joinder provision so as to qualify crimes as "joinable
' '4
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (Vest 1985). California Penal Code section 954 states:
An accusatory pleading may charge two or more offenses connected together in their
commission, or different statements of the same offense or two or more different
offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts, and if two
or more accusatory pleadings are filed in such cases in the same court, the court
may order them consolidated. The prosecution is not required to elect between the
different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading, but the defendant
may be convicted of any number of the offenses charged, and each offense in which
the defendant is convicted must be stated in the verdict or the finding of the court:
provided, that a court in which a case is triable, in the interests of justice and for
good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different offenses or counts
set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately or be divided into two or
more groups and each of the said groups tried separately. An acquittal of one or
more counts shall not be deemed an acquittal of any other count. (emphasis added)
Id.
2. Id.
3. See infra notes 34-48 and accompanying text (economic benefits and prejudices of
joinder).
4. See generally Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 683 P.2d 699, 204 Cal.
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with a minimum of scrutiny' In 1984, however, the California
Supreme Court for the first time assigned meaning to the severance
provision of section 954 in Williams v. Superior Court.6 The supreme
court held in Williams that upon a showing of "substantial prejudice"
from joinder, a defendant has a right to severance of charges
otherwise properly joined under section 954.7 A defendant will satisfy
the substantial prejudice standard under Williams if prejudice to the
defendant from joinder outweighs the economic benefits of joinder
to the stateA
The California Supreme Court wrestled with the notion of sub-
stantial prejudice in subsequent decisions, unable to define a uniform
policy rationale supporting joinder under section 954.9 The result was
a widely varying application of the Williams balancing test. 10 The
development of the Williams standard came to a halt in 1987 when
Justice Lucas replaced Justice Bird on the California Supreme Court."
Since the beginning of 1987, the Lucas Court has applied the Williams
standard in form only, putting great emphasis on the "theoretical"'1
2
economic benefits of joinder, and minimizing the prejudice faced by
the defendant.' 3 At present, lower courts and both prosecuting and
defense attorneys ask what standards to use in ruling on severance
motions.14
Rptr. 700 (1984) (crimes that meet the broad joinder requirements of the joinder provision of
Penal Code section 954 are "joinable" even if they may be severed under the severance
provision).
5. See infra notes 35-34 and accompanying text (udicial interpretation of the joinder
provision of Penal Code section 954).
6. 36 Cal. 3d 441, 683 P.2d 699, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1984). See also infra notes 52-140
and accompanying text (in depth analysis of Williams decision).
7. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 452, 683 P.2d at 706, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
8. Id. (failure by a trial court to sever joined crimes that substantially prejudice the
defendant constitutes an abuse of discretion).
9. See infra notes 144-99 and accompanying text (varying interpretations of the Williams
standard).
10. Id.
11. See infra notes 200-64 and accompanying text (extremely narrow interpretations of
the Williams balancing test).
12. U.S. v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also, People v. Smallwood,
42 Cal. 3d 415, 426, 722 P.2d 197, 208, 228 Cal. Rptr. 913, 923 (1986) (if multiple charges
share no evidence, the general economy realized from their joinder is merely "theoretical").
Cf. People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d. 144, 711 P.2d 480, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1985) (economy
realized due to high degree of shared witnesses between two murders). But see, People v.
Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 938-41, 760 P.2d 996, 1004-07, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467, 476-480 (1988)
(blanket claim of judicial economy although joined charges shared no evidence at all).
13. See infra notes 200-64 and accompanying text (Lucas court's interpretation of the
Williams balancing test).
14. See infra note 199 and accompanying text (conflicting District Courts of Appeals'
decisions).
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This comment will initially review the derivation of the Williams
standard by charting the development of section 954 from its enact-
ment in 1872.11 Next, the rationale behind each stage of the Williams
Court's analysis will be examined.
16 The interpretation and application
of the Williams standard by courts in subsequent Bird Court cases
will also be discussed.17 The recent corrosion of the standard by the
Lucas Court and the likely standard by which trial courts in the
future will grant or deny defendants' severance motions will be
discussed next.' 8 This comment will conclude that the Lucas Court
is giving only lip service to the prejudicial considerations of joinder
laid out in Williams and is compromising defendants' rights to a fair
trial.'9 Finally, in accordance with the legislative purpose behind
section 954, this comment will offer proposals aimed at ensuring
defendants charged with multiple crimes as fair a trial as those
charged with only one crime.20
I. TE DEVELOPMENT OF PENAL CODE SECTION 954
Available legislative history suggests that judicial economy is a
relatively recent purpose behind Penal Code section 954.21 From its
enactment in 1872, until 1915 when the statute was amended for the
third time, section 954 served to liberalize some of the common law
requirements of exactness of pleading.
2 Prosecutors were permitted
15. See infra notes 21-51 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 52-140 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 141-98 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 199-254 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 255-64 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 265-79 and accompanying text.
21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (Vest 1985). See also infra notes 22-51 and accompanying
text (development of Penal Code section 954).
22. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (West 1985) with 1872 Cal. Stat. ch. 572, sec. 211
at 110 (amending the Criminal Practice Act, 1851 Cal. Stat. ch. 29, sec. 241 at 238) 
and 1874
Cal. Stat. ch. 614, sec. 44 at 437 (amending 1872 Cal. Stat. ch. 572, sec. 211 at 110) 
and
1905 Cal. Stat. ch. 574, sec. 1 at 772 (amending 1874 Cal. Stat. ch. 614, sec. 44 
at 437) and
1915 Cal. Stat. ch. 452, sec. 1 at 774 (amending 1905 Cal. Stat. ch. 574, sec. 1 at 
737). The
Criminal Practice Act came from from New York Code of Criminal Procedure sections 
278
and 279. California Penal Code section 954, as enacted in 1872, stated, "The indictment 
must
charge but one offense, and in one form only, except that when the offense may be committed
by the use of different means, the indictment may allege the means in the alternative." 
1872
Cal. Stat. ch. 572, sec. 211 at 110 (amending Criminal Practice Act, 1851 Cal. Stat. 
ch. 29,
sec. 241 at 238). See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 705 (2d ed. 1985)
(hereinafter LAFAvE). Originally, an indictment was required to be very specific in naming 
the
charge sought to be proved, and the means by which it was alleged to have been carried 
out.
Id. at 721-24. If the indictment was incorrect, the defendant was acquitted, guilty or not. Id.
1237
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
to charge multiple offenses on a single indictment and allege alter-
native means by which those offenses may have been committed.23
However, before 1915, all charged offenses had to relate to the same
act and the defendant could be convicted only of one charged
offense.A
The 1915 amendment expanded section 954 to permit multiple,
unrelated offenses or counts belonging to the same class to be joined
and tried together.25 Crimes of the same class are crimes possessing
The purpose of the original section was to allow prosecutors to give alternative means bywhich a crime may have been committed, so that a conviction did not have to rest entirely
on the correctness of a single theory. Id. at 715-21.
Penal Code section 954 was amended in 1874. (1874 Cal. Stat. ch. 614, sec. 44 at 437(amending 1872 Cal. Stat. ch. 572, sec. 211 at 110). The 1873-74 amendment read, "Theindictment must charge but one offense, but the same offense may be set forth in different
forms under different counts, and, when the offense may be committed by the use of different
means, the means may be alleged in the alternative in the same count." Id.
Although there is little by way of legislative intent for this ammendment, its purpose wasmost likely to give the prosecution even greater flexibility in obtaining a conviction. See
LAFAvE, supra at 721-30. Allowing an indictment to list the same charge under differentcounts eliminated the risk that a guilty defendant would be set free, because the defendant's
acts fit the definition of a crime other than the one charged. Id. "Count" and "charge,"when used relative to allegations in an indictment or information, are synonymous. BLAcK's
LAw DicrioNARY at 314 (5th Ed. 1979).
Section 954 was further amended in 1905, permitting multiple offenses or counts to be
joined if they all bore relation to one act or event. 1905 Cal. Stat. ch. 574, sec. 1 at 772(amending 1874 Cal. Stat. ch.614, sec. 44 at 437). The 1905 amendment amended the section
to read:
The indictment or information may charge different offenses, or different statements
of the same offense, under separate counts, but they must all relate to the same
act, transaction, or event and charges of offenses occurring at different and distinct
times and places must not be joined. The prosecution is not required to elect between
the different offenses or counts set forth in the indictment or information, but thedefendant can be convicted of but one of the offenses charged, and the same must
be stated in the verdict. (emphasis added)
Id. This 1905 amendment was the first version of section 954, which allowed separate offenses
to be joined. Id. However, since only one offense charged could result in a conviction, thepurpose of the statute was probably not judicial economy. See LAFAVE, supra at 704-720.
Although, again, legislative history on this amendment is barren of recorded purpose, caselaw suggests that the addition of a provision allowing multiple offenses describing the same
act to be charged and joined merely served to increase the chance of a conviction on somecriminal theory. See, e.g., People v. Koehn, 207 Cal. 605, 279 P. 646 (1929). There is also
evidence to suggest that joinder of separate offenses on a single indictment was for the purposeof controlling abuse of the indictment process by marshalls, who were paid per indictment,
hence had incentive to draw up as many as possible. See Comment, Joint and Single Trials,
74 YALE L.J. 552, 560 (1965) (a legislative interest in judicial economy may have been only a
by-product of joinder).
23. 1905 Cal. Stat. ch. 574, sec. I at 772 (amending 1874 Cal. Stat. ch. 614, sec. 44 at
437).
24. Id.
25. 1915 Cal. Stat. ch. 452, sec. 1 at 744 (amending 1905 Cal. Stat. ch. 574, sec. I at772). The 1915 amendment essentially gave section 954 its present wording. Compare CAL
PENAL CODE § 954 (West 1985) with id. The amendment suggests a change of purpose fromall the previous amendments. There is evidence to suggest that the amendment's drafters
1238
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"common characteristics or attributes" .26 Further, the 1915 amend-
ment provided for joinder of crimes which were not of the same
class if the crimes were "connected in their commission".27 Crimes
are connected in their commission if they share one or more "com-
mon elements of substantial importance". 28 The 1915 amendment
also allowed a defendant to be convicted of any number of crimes
charged. 29 A legislative interest in judicial economy is evidenced in
these changes.30 Most important, the 1915 amendment permitted a
court, in its discretion, to order that all crimes be tried separately if
justice so required. 31 The 1915 amendment gave section 954 essentially
its present wording, and modern interpretation of section 954 is based
on case law beginning with the 1915 amendment.
recognized some measure of economy by joining offenses. See generally Kellett v. Superior
Court, 63 Cal.2d 822, 409 P.2d 206, 48 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1966); People v. Dorenzo, 46 Cal.
App. 2d 411, 415, 115 P.2d 858, 862 (1921); People v. West, 34 Cal. App. 2d 55, 59, 93 P.2d
153, 158 (1920); People v. Thorn, 138 Cal. App. 714, 735, 33 P.2d 5 (1917) (joinder of crimes
with overlapping evidence saves public money). Although judicial economy does not appear
to have been an original purpose of this section, the fact that the 1915 amendment allowed
multiple indictments to be consolidated for a single trial indicates this new interest. People v.
Scott, 24 Cal. 2d 774, 779, 151 P.2d 517, 520-21 (1944). See also, Orfield, Consolidation in
Federal Criminal Procedure, 40 ORE. L. Rnv. 318 (1961). A legislative interest in judicial
economy also may be evidenced by the broadening of the definition of joinable offenses from
ones in the "same transaction," to ones of the same general "class". Id at 321-26. By allowing
joinder of crimes in the same class, the drafters may have hoped to save the court time, and
therefore public funds. Id. at 326. The rationale presumably was that since crimes of the same
class share one or more essential elements, the definition of those elements would only have
to be explained to one jury at one time. Id. at 326-30. Cf. People v. Kemp, 55 Cal. 2d 458,
476, 359 P.2d 913, 930-31, 11 Cal. Rptr. 361, 375 (1961) (crimes of the same class defined so
liberally in California that their joinder bears little relation to a goal of judicial economy).
The drafters of the 1915 amendment also must have realized that the loosening of joinder
requirements increased the possibility of prejudice to the defendant when they added a severance
provision in the 1915 Amendment. See, People v. Garcia, 2 Cal. 2d 673, 42 P.2d 1013 (1935);
People v. Northcott, 209 Cal. 639, 289 P. 226 (1930); People v. Kelley, 203 Cal. 128, 263 P.
226 (1928) (sensitivity to prejudice arising from joinder).
26. People v. Rhoden, 6 Cal. 3d 519, 524, 492 P.2d 1143, 1146, 99 Cal. Rptr. 751, 755
(1972).
27. 1915 Cal. Stat. ch. 452, sec 1 at 744 (amending 1905 Cal. Stat. ch. 574, sec. 1 at
772).
28. People v. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d 29, 33, 528 P. 2d 756, 762, 117 Cal. Rptr. 664, 668
(1974).
29. 1915 Cal. Stat. ch. 452, sec. 1 at 744 (amending 1905 Cal. Stat. ch. 574, sec. 1 at
772). The 1915 amendment stated, in pertinant part: "The prosecution is not required to elect
between the different offenses set forth in the indictment, but the defendent may be convicted
of any number of the offenses charged. . ." Id.
30. An intent to promote judicial economy is not expressely stated in committee reports,
but case law has declared such an intent. See, e.g., People v. Thorn, 138 Cal. App. 714, 735,
33 P.2d 5, 12 (1917).
31. 1915 Cal. Stat. ch. 452, sec. 1, at 744 (amending CAL. PENAL CoDE § 954) Cf. CAL
PENAL CODE § 954 (West 1985) (the wording of the severance provision changed only slightly
after the 1915 amendment).
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Since 1915, courts have applied the joinder provision of section
954 liberally, finding joinder proper per se when the joined crimes
share common characteristics, or any common element of substantial
importance.32 Crimes as distinct as a rape and a robbery are joinable
under section 954 as crimes of the same "class" because they have
the common characteristic of an assaultive nature. 33 Moreover, courts
have primarily interpreted the legislative intent behind the joinder
provision of section 954 as judicial economy. 34
32. See People v. Kemp, 55 Cal. 2d 458, 476, 359 P.2d 913, 923, 11 Cal. Rptr. 361, 371(1961) (the California Supreme Court defined "crimes of the same class" under Penal Code
section 954 as "offenses possessing common characteristics or attributes"). See, e.g., People
v. Rhoden, 6 Cal. 3d 519, 524, 492 P.2d 1143, 1147, 99 Cal. Rptr. 751, 755 (1972) (robbery,rape and kidnapping may be joined because they are all assaultive crimes). Crimes of the same
class were not originally interpreted so broadly. Cf. People v. Frank 130 Cal. 212, 19 P.2d
850 (1933) (prejudicial error to join charges of robbery and burglary with charge of assault
with intent to commit murder which occured four months later, since the crimes were notones of the same class and they shared no overlapping evidence to promote judicial economy).
Even where the offenses are not in the same class, they may be joined if they are "connected
in their commission" containing "common elements of substantial importance in their com-mission." People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 492, 341 P.2d 679, 694 (1959). The Chessman
court said that the common element of substantial importance between seventeen joined crimeswas an intent to obtain property feloniously. Id. The court in Chessman used the term"common element of substantial importance" quite differently from prior California Supreme
Court cases, which used common elements of substantial importance to refer to evidencecommon to all joined charges, which when consolidated would save the state money. Id. See,
e.g., People v. Kelly, 203 Cal. 128, 133-35, 263 P.2d 266, 270-74 (1928) (string of robberies
and murders all occuring on the same day, using the same weapons and stolen vehicle shared
common elements of substantial importance in that the proof of one joined charge tended toprove facts material to proof of the others; the charges were cross-admissible); People v. Scott,
24 Cal. 2d 774, 778-79, 151 P.2d 517, 520 (1944) (charge of altering a firearm serial number
could be joined with rape charge in which the altered weapon was used by the defendant in
the conunission of the rape, because the weapon was a common element of substantial
importance in both crimes). Joined crimes need not relate to the same transaction and can
even have been committed at different times and places as long as they share a common
element of substantial importance in their commission. See, e.g., People v. Pike, 58 Cal. 2d
70, 84, 372 P.2d 656, 669, 22 Cal. Rptr. 664, 677 (1962) (same gun used by defendant in tworobberies ocurring two days apart was common element of substantial importance in the
commission of both crimes). Actually, the crimes in Chessman had numerous common elements
of substantial importance in the traditional sense. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d at 473-75, 341 P.2dat 682-85. Chessman involved robberies and rapes wherein the defendant not only had a similarmodus operandi but also used the same stolen vehicle in many of the joined charges. Id.
However, the language in Chessman has enabled future courts to find crimes "connected in
their commission for purposes of Penal Code section 954 when the crimes do not have any
overlapping evidence. See, e.g., People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 171, 711 P.2d 480, 494,222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 196 (1985). The California Supreme Court best described the state of
joinder under section 954 in Matson, 13 Cal. 3d at 39, 528 P.2d at 756, 117 Cal. Rptr. at667. In Matson, the Supreme Court stated that, "Where consolidation meets the test of
joinder .... the difficulty of showing prejudice from denial of severance is so great that courts
almost invariably reject the claim of abuse of discretion." Id.
33. Rhoden, 6 Cal. 3d at 524-25, 492 P.2d at 1148, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
34. See e.g. Kellett v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 822, 832, 409 P.2d 20, 25, 648 Cal.
Rptr. 366, 371. (1966) (statutory amendments expanding the scope of permissible joinderdemonstrate legislative purpose to prevent harassment, avoid needless repetition of evidence,
1240
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The state's interest in judicial economy may be realized in several
ways when crimes are joined under section 954.35 First, the joined
charges may be "cross-admissible" pursuant to section 1101(b) of
the California Evidence Code.3 6 Subject to strict threshold require-
ments, 37 section 1101(b) permits the prosecution to introduce evidence
of uncharged38 crimes, for the limited purpose of resolving a disputed
fact such as the identity or intent of the alleged perpetrator in the
crime charged.39 Section 1101(a) expressly prohibits evidence of un-
and save the state and the defendant time and money); see also Matson, 13 Cal. 3d at 41,
528 P.2d at 754, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 668 (1974) (judicial economy is the purpose of section 954
recognized by the California Supreme Court).
35. See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text (economic benefits of joinder). See also
Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 403. (1916) and Matson, 13 Cal. 3d at 41, 528 P.2d
at 757, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 668 (United States and California Supreme Court cases holding that
a defendant benefits from a joint trial by avoiding the harassment of two complete trials).
But see Coleman v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 129, 138-39, 172 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91
(1981). Avoidance of needless harassment of the defendant is not a valid benefit of joinder if
it is the defendant who has moved for separate trials. Id.
36. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1989 Supp.). Evidence Code section 1101(b) actually
refers to the admissibility of evidence of uncharged crimes in the trial of charged ones. The
section provides:
(a) . .. [e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of his character (whether in the
form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of
conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his conduct on a specified occasion.
(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person
committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such
as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident) other than his disposition to commit such acts. (emphasis
added)
CAL. Evso. CODE § 1101(b).
37. See People v. Moreno, 61 Cal. App. 3d 688, 693, 132 Cal. Rptr. 569, 571-72 (1976);
JEFFERSON, CAL. EViDENCE BENCH BOOK, 1201 (2d ed.1982) [hereinafter JEMRSON] (to establish
relevency of the other crime(s) evidence sought to be admitted under Evidence Code section
1101(b), the prosecutor must first prove defendant's culpability in the collateral crime by a
preponderance of the evidence). But see, People v. Albertson, 23 Cal. 2d 550, 578, 145 P.2d
7, 11 (1944) (requires proof of defendant's culpability in uncharged act by "the clear weight
of the evidence"). The clear and convincing evidence standard is also the standard used by
federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273 (9th. Cir. 1987). Some
jurisdictions require proof of defendant's culpability in the collateral crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. See, e.g., Ernster v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 422, 308 S.W.2d 33 (1957); see generally,
Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J.
763 (1961) (providing an in depth discussion of restrictions on admission of other crimes
evidence and standards of proof).
Further, the collateral evidence will be excluded regardless of its probative value if the trial
judge determines that evidence is overly prejudicial to the defendant under Evidence Code
section 352. See People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 316, 611 P.2d 883, 895, 165 Cal. Rptr.
289, 301. (1980); People v. Deeney, 145 Cal. App. 3d 647, 652, 193 Cal. Rptr. 608, 611
(1983).
38. See B. WnrrKN, CAIFOaNIA CRIMNAL PROCEDURE, 286-88 (2d ed. 1986); People v.
Shells, 4 Cal. 3d 626, 632, 483 P.2d 1227, 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279 (1971) (uncharged
crimes are collateral crimes for which the the defendant is not currently being tried).
39. See People v. Johnson, 43 Cal. 3d 296, 317-23, 730 P.2d 131, 147-51, 233 Cal. Rptr.
562, 578-81 (1988) (Bird, C.J. concurring) (comprehensive application of section 1101(b));
1241
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charged crimes if offered only to show a defendant's criminal dis-
position. 4° When multiple charged crimes are joined under section
954, if evidence of each joined crime would hypothetically be ad-
missible in a separate trial of any other under an 1101(b) theory, the
charges are cross-admissible. 41 Joining cross-admissible charges under
section 954 saves public resources by consolidating, for a single trial,
charges which would ultimately be cross-referenced in separate trials
under'an 1101(b) theory. 42 Second, joining charges that share a
substantial number of facts and witnesses avoids duplication of
evidence that would result from separate trials.4 3 Finally, the state
benefits economically even when charges sharing no evidence are
joined, by having to impanel only one jury and staff one courtroom. 4
People v. Moreno, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1179, 233 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1987) (discussing intent in
dispute); People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d. 604, 685 P.2d 1126, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1984) (where
defendant's identity is in dispute, proof of a modus operandi common to both acts is sufficient
to identify defendant). Two factors determine whether identity is sufficiently in dispute for
purposes of cross-admissibility between multiple crimes: (1) the degree of distinctiveness of
individual shared marks; (2) the number of minimally distinctive shared marks. Williams v.
Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 450, 683 P.2d 699, 703, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 705 (1984).
40. CAL. Evn. CODE § 1101(a) (West Supp. 1989) provides, in pertinant part, "...
[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of
an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is
inadmissible when offered to prove his conduct on a specified occasion." (emphasis added)
Id.
41. See Coleman v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 109, 111-14, 172 Cal. Rptr. 86,
87-90 (1981) ("cross-admissibile" is the term used by courts to describe crimes in a joint trial
when the evidence of the crimes would be admissible in separate trials of the crimes under an
Evidence Code section 1101(b) theory). See also supra notes 36-41 (application of section
1101(b)).
42. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 448, 683 P.2d at 703, 204 Cal.Rptr. at 704. See also Comment,
Joint and Single Trials, 74 YALE L.J. 553 at 556-60 (1965) (hereinafter Joint and Single Trials).
When crimes have been found cross-admissible, prejudice from joinder is no longer an issue
because under an Evidence Code section 1101(b) theory, the probative value of the other
crime(s) evidence has already been found to be greater than the prejudice to the defendant.
Id. As a result, courts have held that cross-admissibility dispels any possibility of prejudice.
Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 448, 683 P.2d at 703, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 704. See supra notes 36-42
and accompanying text. (requirements for admission of evidence of uncharged crimes).
43. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d at 39, 528 P.2d at 755, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 668. But see, JOINT
A SINGLE TRIALs, supra, note 42 at 560. Since duplication of evidence would naturally tend
to increase with the more common facts and witnesses existing between the charges, there will
normally be little "economy of evidence" in joining crimes which are not either part of the
same transaction or "cross-admissible". The result is a single trial which lasts much longer,
tying up a courtroom, judge and counsel, to the same extent that separate trials would do so.
Id.
44. People v. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 942, 760 P.2d 996, 1008, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467, 479
(1988). But see, Williams, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 451, 683 P.2d 699, 708, 204 Cal. Rptr 700, 707. It
is essential to distinguish between "judicial economy" and "avoidance of waste of public
funds" because judicial economy is always present to some extent when charges are consolidated
for a single trial. Id. However, economy is not justified unless separate trials would result in
a waste of public funds. Id. A waste of public funds occurs when the joined charges share a
sufficient number of facts and witnesses that separate trials would result in considerable
1242
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The severance provision added in the 1915 amendment to section
954, providing for severance of joined crimes in the interests of
justice, recognizes the danger of prejudice to the defendant due to
joinder.45 When multiple charged crimes are joined against a single
defendant, a jury may convict the defendant for a criminal disposition
rather than the defendant's actual guilt.46 The prohibition in Evidence
Code section 1101(a) recognizes this danger with respect to evidence
of uncharged crimes. 47 A defendant may be further prejudiced if one
duplication of evidence. Id. Determining what degree of similarity is necessary between joined
charges to justify judicial economy gained from joinder, and whether, as a matter of judicial
policy, judicial economy can even be balanced against a defendant's right to a fair trial, are
matters over which courts have thus far been unable to agree. See infra notes 140-240 and
accompanying text (differing views on balancing state interests against a defendant's right to
a "fair" trial).
45. See generally Coleman, 116 Cal. App. 3d 129, 172 Cal. Rptr. 86; People v. Smallwood,
42 Cal. 3d 415, 722 P.2d 197, 228 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1986). Joinder of crimes under Penal Code
section 954 results in the same form of prejudice which renders evidence of uncharged offenses
inadmissible under section 1101(a) of the Evidence Code (subject to the section 1101(b) exception
discussed in notes 36-42, supra). See People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 316, 611 P.2d 883,
897, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 303 (1980).
The primary reason that underlies this basic rule of exclusion, [section 1101(a)], is
not the unreasonable nature of the forbidden chain of reasoning. Rather, it is the
insubstantial nature of the inference as compared to the grave danger of prejudice
to an accused when evidence of an uncharged offense is given to the jury. We have
thus reached the conclusion that the risk of convicting the innocent... is sufficiently
imminent for us to forgo the slight marginal gain in punishing the guilty.
Id. Cf. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 455-58, 683 P.2d at 708-10, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 708-11.
(Goldstein, J., dissenting) (section 1101(a) concerns are irrelevant when all crimes are charged).
See also ABA PROJECT ON INIum STANDARDs FOR CRIMINAL JUsTICE, STANDARDs RELATING
TO JonDER AND SEVERANCE (Approved Draft 1978) stds. 13-2.1 & 13-3.1(a) (the ABA standards
permit severance of unrelated charges on request of the accused). The federal courts share a
similar view. See, e.g., United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733 (4th. Cir. 1976):
While to the layman's mind a defendant's criminal disposition is logically relevent
to his guilt or innocence of a specific crime, the law regards the inference from
general to specific as so weak, and the danger of prejudice so great, that it attempts
to prevent conviction on account of a defendant's bad character ..... One inevitable
consequence of a joint trial is that the jury will be aware of evidence of one crime
while considering the defendant's guilt or innocence in another. If the rationale of
the "other crimes" rule is correct, it would seem that some degree of prejudice is
necessarily created by permitting the jury to hear evidence of both crimes.
Id. at 736 (citing Drew v. United States 331 F.2d 85, 89-90. (D.C. Cir. 1964)). See generally,
Greene and Loftus, When Crimes are Joined at Trial, 9 LAw AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 193
(1985); Tanford, Penrod, and Collins, Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence
of Charge Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 319 (1985)
(found through a jury simulation study that joined charges result in increased convictions and
aggregation of evidence, despite limiting instructions). The above theories of prejudice apply
to joint trials in which multiple defendants as well as charges are joined. However, multiple
defendants are beyond the scope of this comment. See generally, Joint and Single Trials, supra
note 42 at 556-60 (discussion of joinder of multiple defendants).
46. Foutz, 540 F. 2d at 736 n.13 (inference of guilt based upon defendant's bad character
rather than defendant's culpability in the crime charged).
47. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1101(a) (West Supp. 1989) (makes character evidence inadmissible
if offered to show a defendant's action in conformity with that character on a specific
occasion).
1243
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
or more joined crimes is particularly inflammatory or has weak
evidentiary support in relation to the others. 48 Although the severance
provision of the 1915 amendment to section 954 implied that joinder
of some crimes could be prejudicial, the California Supreme Court
neither authoritatively interpretated nor enforced the provision until
1984 in Williams v. Superior Court.49 The supreme court in Williams
established a two part test for determining the existence of substantial
prejudice. 0 The test became the standard approach for determining
the propriety of joinder under section 954. 51
II. THE SEVERANCE PROVISION OF SECTION 954
A. Williams v. Superior Court
1. Facts
In Williams, the defendant, a gang member, was charged with five
offenses including two counts of murder with special circumstances.12
The two murders occurred nine months apart and were both the
result of gang violence.5 3 The first murder occurred in June 1981
48. See Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 453-54, 683 P.2d at 706-07, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
(ways in which crimes might be inflammatory and their prejudicial effect). With respect to
joinder of crimes of unequal strengths, the court in Williams said, "[o]ur principal concern
lies in the danger that the jury would aggregate all of the evidence, though presented separately
in relation to each charge and convict on both charges in a joint trial; whereas, at least
arguably, in separate trials, there might not be convictions on both charges, [or either]." Id.
See also People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 173, 711 P.2d 480, 494, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 197
(1985) (when evidence, in the aggregate, makes one or both charges appear stronger than they
really are, courts refer to the result as the "spill-over" effect).
See also Joint and Single Trials, supra, note 42 at 556-60. A criminal defendant suffers
from another form of prejudice when charges are joined. Id. The fifth amendment right of
the accused to remain silent is infringed upon when charges are joined, because courts have
held that either: (1) the defendant waives this right on all charges if he testifies to one, and
(2) even if he may remain silent on one charge, the result is an accentuation of that silence
due to the defendant testifying on the other charge. Id. The presumption is that the defendant
has something to hide. Id. This additional form of prejudice is beyond the scope of this
comment, but should be borne in mind by the reader when considering prejudice from joinder
as a whole.
49. 36 Cal. 3d. 456, 683 P.2d 689, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1984).
50. Id. at 448-54, 683 P.2d at 690-696, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 704-08. See also infra notes 68-
125 and accompanying text (the Williams balancing test).
51. See infra notes 148-231 and accompanying text (application of Williams standard
in subsequent cases).
52. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 442-45, 683 P.2d at 700-01, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02.
53. Id.
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when three assailants opened fire on four persons standing near a
gym. 5 4 One of the four was killed.55 Several witnesses testified that
the defendant, Williams, was one of the assailants.5 6 All parties
involved were allegedly associated with gangs.5 7 No evidence showed
that Williams did any of the shooting.
5 8
The second murder occurred in March 1982.51 On that occasion,
an eyewitness allegedly observed Williams driving a van with two
passengersA0 The witness allegedly observed an arm holding a hand-
gun extended from the driver's window. 61 A few moments later, the
victim was shot and killed as he stood on the sidewalk next to the
van.62 The witness was unable positively to connect the arm holding
the gun with Williams who was driving the van.
63
Williams moved to sever the charges on the grounds of prejudice,
but the trial court denied the motion 4 The California Supreme Court
reversed, holding that although the crimes had satisfied the joinder
provision of section 954-because murders are crimes of the same
class-the appellant had nevertheless established "substantial preju-
dice" from joinder.65 The court determined substantial prejudice by
applying the "Williams Standard"%, a balancing test that judges the
propriety of joinder under section 954 by balancing the economic
benefits of joinder to the state against the prejudicial effect of joinder











64. Id. The basis of the court's denial was straight-forward. The California Supreme
Court had previously considered severance motions under section 954 frivolous and without
merit, if the joined charges had satisfied the broad joinder requirements. Id. at 446, 683 P 2d
at 702, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 703 See, e.g. People v. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d 35, 39, 528 P.2d 756,
760, 117 Cal. Rptr. 664, 667 (1974) ("Where consolidation meets the test of joinder... the
difficulty of showing prejudice from denial of severance is so great that the courts almost
invariably reject the claim of abuse of discretion").
65. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 443-54, 683 P.2d at 702-07, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 704-08.
66. The "Williams standard" is the name attached by this author to the analysis under-
taken by the supreme court in Williams when the court balanced the benefits against the
prejudice of joinder under Penal Code section 954.
67. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 447-54, 683 P.2d at 703-08, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 704-08. See
also supra notes 71-125 and accompanying text (the balancing of economic benefits of joinder
against prejudice to the defendant).
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2. The Williams Standard
The analysis of substantial prejudice under the "Williams Stan-
dard", or balancing test, calls for an initial determination of cross-
admissibility under Evidence Code section 1101(b). 68 If the joined
charges are not cross-admissible, possible additional economic bene-
fits of joinder to the prosecution are then balanced against possible
additional prejudicial circumstances to the defendant arising from




As the first step in analyzing a question of substantial prejudice
resulting from joinder, the Williams court looked to the issue of
cross-admissibility under section 1101(b). 7' The court began with a
determination of cross-admissibility because cross-admissibility be-
tween joined charges negates a claim of substantial prejudice. 72 The
rationale is that since evidence of each joined charge would be
admitted in separate trials under section 1101(b) if the charges had
been severed, the prejudice to the defendant is minimal while at the
same time the economic savings to the state are significant. 73 The
state benefits economically because a consolidated trial requires only
jury and courtroom.74 In addition, since a great deal of evidence
from each joined charge would have to be cross-referenced to resolve
a disputed fact under section 1101(b) if the charges were tried
68. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 448-52, 683 P.2d at 705-06, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 704-06. See
also infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text (application of cross-admissibility in balancing
test).
69. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 452-53, 683 P.2d at 705-06, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 707. See also
infra notes 85-125 and accompanying text (application of benefits versus prejudice in balancing
test).
70. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 453, 683 P.2d at 706, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
71. Id. at 448-52, 683 P.2d at 702-05, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 704-6. See also supra notes 36-
42 and accompanying text (theory of cross-admissibility).
72. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 448, 683 P.2d at 702, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
73. LAFAvB, supra note 22 at 659-60. See also Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 90
(D.C. Cir. 1964); People v. Poon, 125 Cal. App. 3d 55, 70-74, 178 Cal. Rptr. 375, 383-87
(1981) (cases reasoning that cross-admissibility between joined charges negates an argument by
the defendant of prejudicial joinder).
74. LAFAxv, supra note 22 at 659-60.
1246
1989 / California Penal Code Section 954
separately, the state saves time by having to put on evidence of each
charge only once. 75
The Williams court entertained the issue of cross-admissibility with
respect to the disputed fact of the defendant's identity in the two
murders. 76 The court found, however, that the joined murder charges
did not share enough distinct characteristics to pass the strict standard
for cross-admissibility on a theory of modus operandi under section
1 101(b). 77 Moreover, because the crimes were not cross-admissible, a
joint trial would subject the defendant to prejudicial circumstances
prohibited by Evidence Code section 1101(a). 78 Section 1101(a) ex-
pressely prohibits use of other crimes' evidence which is relevant only
in its tendancy to show a defendant's criminal disposition. 79 There-
fore, noncross-admissibility between joined charges effects a joint
trial in two ways: first, the state derives less economic benefit from
a consolidated trial because evidence from the joined charges could
not be cross-referenced in separate trials of the same charges; second,
the defendant is subject to prejudicial character inferences which
section 1101(a) was designed to protect the defendant from.80
75. Id.
76. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 448-51, 683 P.2d at 703-05, 204 Cal. Rptr at 704-06. The
Williams court stated that admission of other crimes' evidence under Evidence Code section
1101(b) to prove a suspect's disputed identity requires that the crimes possess a "sufficiently
high degree of common features" wherefrom an inference could be drawn that if the defendant
committed one act, he committed the other(s) Id. See also supra note 39 (identity in dispute).
77. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 448-51, 683 P.2d at 703-05, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 704-06. Cf.
Coleman v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 129, 137-38, 172 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (1981).
Comparing Coleman on the issue of cross-admissibility, it becomes apparent that in both
cases, the trial court misunderstood the application of Evidence Code section 1101(b). The
existence of a modus operandi to prove the identity of the defendant requires a high degree
of similarity between crimes because of the potential prejudice to the defendant. Williams, 36
Cal. 3d at 448-51, 683 P.2d at 702-05, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 704-05. Unfortunately, trial courts
vary widely in their scrutiny of what degree of commonality between crimes satisfies sufficient
similar characteristics. Compare People v. Deeney, 145 Cal. App. 3d 647, 654, 193 Cal. Rptr.
608, 612 (1983) (prior abuse by the defendant spouse was allowed into evidence at murder
trial only for impeachment purposes, in the absence of a modus operandi) with People v.
Zack, 184 Cal. App. 3d 409, 416, 229 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320 (1986) (prior incidents of abuse
were admissible without showing a modus operandi, as long as the defendant has or had a
previous relationship with the victim). A proper ruling on cross-admissibility is vital, however,
since its existence makes joinder almost per se proper. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 448, 683 P.2d
at 704, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 703-04. Both Coleman and Williams analysed the issue of cross-
admissibility with very high scrutiny, suggesting great sensitivity to the prejudice inherent in
putting evidence of more than one crime before the jury. Id; Coleman, 116 Cal. App. 3d at
138-40, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91.
78. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 448, 683 P.2d at 703, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
79. Id. See also supra note 45 (rationale behind exclusion of character evidence).
80. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 448, 683 P.2d at 703, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 704. Williams was
not the first case to view cross-admissibility as so pivotal in ruling on a severance motion. See
Coleman, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 137-38, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (1st DCA). Interestingly, it appears
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The Williams court also indicated that because there may be
additional economic benefits from joinder, the lack of cross-admis-
sibility alone would not always be sufficient to show substantial
prejudice."' The Williams court adopted the reasoning of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's earlier decision in People v. Matson z, wherein
the court held that because there were economic benefits of a joint
trial beyond those due to cross-admissibility, a defendant would also
have to show additional prejudice beyond that inherent in joinder of
noncross-admissible charges . 3 In light of the Matson rule, the Wil-
liams court undertook the second stage of the analysis, a weighing
of possible "additional benefits" of joinder against possible addi-
tional prejudices against the defendant. 84
b. Additional Benefits of Joinder
The court in Matson held that noncross-admissibility alone was
insufficient to make a denial of a defendant's severance motion an
abuse of discretion.85 The Matson court reasoned that a proper ruling
on a severance motion requires a balancing of the probative value
of joinder under section 1101(b) against the prejudicial effect on the
defendant.16 Strictly speaking, unless evidence from one joined charge
is relevant in resolving a disputed fact in another joined charge under
an 1101(b) theory, that evidence has no permissible probative value. 87
that the trial court in Coleman, although making an incorrect ruling on cross-admissibility,
nevertheless predicated its decision to deny the defendant's original motion to sever on that
issue alone. Id. But see, Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 456-57, 683 P.2d at 706, 204 Cal. Rptr. at
709 (Goldstein, J., dissenting) (Coleman majority was "enticed" by "inverse logic", when it
ruled that lack of cross-admissibility was a factor suggesting prejudice from joinder). The
prevailing view of cross-admissibility, which apparently the appellants in Coleman argued
should apply both ways, is that cross-admissiblity between joined charges shows an absence
of prejudice. Id. Coleman was the first case which viewed cross-admissibility as a major factor
in determining substantial prejudice. Id. Cf. People v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 433-36,
722 P.2d 197, 206-09, 228 Cal. Rptr. 913, 925-28 (1986) (Lucas, C. J., dissenting) (cross-
admissibility has become a condition of proper joinder).
81. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 450-51, 683 P.2d at 605, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
82. 13 Cal. 3d 35, 528 P.2d 752, 117 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1974).
83. Id. at 41-42, 528 P.2d at 760, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 667-68.
84. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 451-54, 683 P.2d at 705-07, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 706-08. See
also infra, notes 85-125 and accompanying text (application of balancing test, benefits versus
prejudice).
85. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d at 41, 528 P.2d at 757, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 667-68.
86. Id.
87. CAL. EvD. CODE. § 1101(a),(b) (fvest Supp. 1989). See supra notes 36.42 and
accompanying text (if evidence of an uncharged crime is not relevant in resolving a disputed
fact in the crime charged under Evidence Code section 1101(b), that evidence has no permissible
probative value because it is inadmissible as character evidence pursuant to Evidence Code
section 1101(a)).
1248
1989 / California Penal Code Section 954
However, the Matson court looked beyond the actual probative value
under 1101(b) and considered some "additional benefits" of joinder
that are realized when all crimes are charged. 88 These benefits must
be added to the probative value side of the balance against prejudice.8 9
Depending upon the particular facts, additional benefits of joinder
may be realized economically through avoidance of duplicative evi-
dence. 90 A joint trial may also benefit the defendant who might
otherwise be needlessly harassed by having to endure two complete
trials. 91 Theoretically, therefore, a defendant must make a stronger
argument for prejudice than would be necessary to keep evidence
out under 1101(b) of the Evidence Code. 92
In acknowledgement of the Matson rule, the Williams court con-
sidered possible additional benefits of joinder, namely, avoidance of
duplicative evidence and needless harassment of the defendant. 93 The
Williams court did not find any of the additional benefits of joinder
laid out by the Matson court on the facts before it.94 Addressing the
benefit allegedly to be derived from avoiding the duplication of
evidence that would result in separate trials, the court concluded that
on the facts before it, there could be little, if any, duplication since
88. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d at 41, 528 P.2d at 757, 117 Cal. Rptr at 668.
89. Id. The court stated:
The judge's discretion in refusing severance is broader than his discretion in admitting
evidence of uncharged offenses ... In both cases, the probative value of considering
one alleged offense in light of the other must be weighed against the prejudicial
effect, but additional factors favor joinder. Joinder of related charges.., ordinarily
avoids needless harassment of the defendant and the waste of public funds which
may result if the same general facts were to be tried twice in two or more separate
trials.
Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. Notice that additional benefits may be realized when crimes are joined. Id. The
wording by the Matson court implies that additional benefits do not always accrue. Id. In
Matson, additional benefits did accrue because the charges there were cross-admissible, and as
a result, evidence would have been duplicated in separate trials of the crimes Id. at 39, 528
P.2d at 756, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 666. See Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 451, 683
P.2d 699, 705, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 706 (1984) (additional benefits justifying joinder are entirely
dependant on the facts of the case and the amount of evidence common to all joined charges).
91. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d at 41, 528 P.2d at 757, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 668. See supra note 35
(defendant only benefits if defendant is not seeking severance).
92. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d at 41, 528 P.2d at 757, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 668. However, the
Matson court failed to mention that when joined charges are non-cross-admissible, not only
does probative value decrease to zero, but prejudice also increases proportionately. See People
v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 425-6, 722 P.2d 197, 204-05, 228 Cal. Rptr. 913, 919 (1986)
(economic benefits added to the probative value side as a state interest must first offset
conceded prejudice already created by the lack of cross-admissibility). As a result, an argument
can be made that without cross-admissibility, the additional benefits must be quite significant
before they will actually tip a strict balance in favor of joinder.
93. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 451, 683 P.2d at 705, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
94. Id.
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the crimes were not connected together in their commission. 5 Crimes
connected in their commission are almost always either cross-admis-
sible or have all arisen from a single criminal transaction, and as a
result avoid duplicative evidence when consolidated for trial.
96 How-
ever, the term has escaped a precise definition and courts have used
it loosely. 97
95. Id.
96. See People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 492, 341 P.2d 679, 708 (1959) (joined crimes
were connected in their commission when the same car, stolen by the defendant, was used in
10 robberies, all robberies were committed using an automobile spotlight to blind the victims,
and same pistol was used to rob the victims in isolated areas at night); People v. Pike, 58
Cal. 2d 70, 84, 372 P.2d 656, 669, 22 Cal. Rptr. 664, 677 (1962) (joinder of robbery and
murder is proper because the common element of substantial importance was the same gun
used in both crimes). Though the courts in the above cases did not discuss cross-admissibility,
an Evidence Code section 1101(b) theory would probably have applied to both a theory of
modus operandi in the Chessman case and a theory of "opportunity" in Pike. See, e.g.,
People v. Kelly, 203 Cal. 128, 133-36, 263 P. 226, 228-30 (1928) (case in which cross-
admissiblity between crimes was common element of substantial importance justifying joinder
cited by courts in both Chessman and Pike as an example of crimes connected in their
commission). See also People v. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d 35, 39, 528 P. 2d 752, 755, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 664, 666 (1974) (crimes were connected together in their commission for purposes of
Penal Code section 954 because the crimes shared some common elements of substantial
importance in their commission). The common elements were cross-admissibility on theories
of both modus operandi and intent. Id. Crimes are also connected in their commission for
purposes of section 954 when they are part of a single criminal transaction, because one crime
can not be fully explained without facts surrounding the other[s]. See, e.g., People v. Scott,
24 Cal. 2d 774, 778-79, 151 P.2d 517, 521 (1944). Cf. People v. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 760
P.2d 996, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467, 476 (1988); Coleman v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 129,
133-34, 172 Cal. Rptr. 86, 87-88 (1981) (cases in which crimes were not connected together in
their commission because the crimes were neither cross-admissible nor part of the same
transaction). See Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 447, 683 P.2d at 707, 204 Cal. Rptr at 703 (1984)
(two murders occuring on different dates were not connected in their commission since neither
cross-admissible nor part of the same transaction, but four separate crimes which occured in
combination with one of the two murders were joinable as crimes connected in their commission
because they stemmed from a single criminal transaction). By implication, when the court in
Williams held that the joined but unrelated murder charges would promote no judicial economy
under Matson, because they were not connected in their commission, the court may be
understood as saying that joined charges must be either cross-admissible or part of the same
transaction before there will be additional benefits from joinder. The dissent in Williams
actually understood the majority to hold that only cross-admissible crimes could be joined.
Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 455-56, 683 P.2d at 699, 204 Cal. Rptr at 709 (Goldstein, J.,
dissenting). But see Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 448 n.3, 683 P.2d at 701 n.3, 204 Cal. Rptr. at
703 n.3 (majority corrected the dissent's misunderstanding by pointing out its reaffirmance of
People v. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d 35, 41, 528 P.2d 752, 757, 117 Cal. Rptr. 664, 668 (1974)). As
a result, courts are left to assume that there are some situations when noncross-admissible
crimes may be joined with a sufficient showing of economic benefits and a minimum of
additional prejudice. Id. See generally Joint and Single Trials, supra note 42 at 560-61; C.
Lu.v, AN INTRODUCTON TO TH LAW OF EVEDENCE, 160 (2d ed. 1987) (federal and some
other state rules governing admissibility of evidence of uncharged offenses consider all evidence
of same transaction crimes cross-admissible whether all are charged or not, because the evidence
is necessary for a complete understanding of the crime charged).
97. See People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 492, 341 P.2d 679, 702 (1959) (ambiguous
language allows inference that crimes may be connected in their commission when the only
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The Williams court found the second benefit of a joint trial,
avoidance of needless harassment of the defendant, to be irrelevant.98
When it is a defendant who has requested severance of the crimes,
any claim of harassment by that defendant is necessarily waived. 99
Without so stating, Williams put the Matson holding in proper
perspective by changing it from a rule to an exception. 1 ° The Williams
court concluded that although joinder will always avoid some dupli-
cation if the same defendant is involved in all joined crimes, courts
could not consider this avoidance as an "additional benefit" of
joinder under Matson.'0' The court in Williams made clear that a
finding of additional benefits under Matson requires that joined
charges be cross-admissible or otherwise related by virtue of their
having at least some amount of overlapping evidence. 02 But, the
Williams court failed to clarify under what circumstances, if any,
Matson would apply--that is, in the absense of cross-admissibility,
what amount of additional benefits of joinder justify denial of a
common element between them is an intent to obtain property feloniously). Cf. People v.
Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 171, 711 P.2d 480, 507, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 196 (1985) (court used
Chessman to support an argument that crimes were connected in their commission for purposes
of joinder under section 954 and found unrelated robbery/murder and robbery/rape charges
connected in their commission merely because they both involved use of a shotgun (not the
same shotgun) and an intent to obtain property feloniously). See infra notes 151-77 and
accompanyiny text (loose application of "crimes connected in their commission" by Balderas
court "watered down" the implicit limitation set by the Williams' and Coleman courts on
when "additional benefits" under Matson would be legitimate for purposes of a severance
ruling).
98. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 451, 683 P.2d at 705, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
99. Id.
100. Id. See also supra note 96 (short of expressly limiting Matson, the Williams court
implied that when crimes are not cross-admissible or at least part of the same transaction,
economic benefits from joinder will not be sufficient to support a claim by the state for
additional benefits under Matson).
101. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 451, 683 P.2d at 706, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
102. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 451, 683 P.2d at 705, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 706. The court in
Williams drew an analogy to People v. Brock, 66 Cal. 2d 645, 655, 426 P.2d 889, 901, 58
Cal. Rptr. 321, 330-31 (1967), when giving an example of a case where crimes were "connected
in their commission" so as to satisfy additional benefits under Matson. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d
at 451, 683 P.2d at 705, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 706. Brock involved joined burglary charges in
which stolen items and tools used by the defendant in committing two burglaries were found
in defendant's motel room. Brock, 66 Cal. 2d at 655, 426 P.2d at 901, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 330-
31. The burglary charges in Brock were cross-admissible. Id. The analogy to Brock seems an
accurate interpretation of Matson since the language in Matson stressing the additional economic
benefits of joinder came from Brock. Compare People v. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d 35, 41, 528
P.2d 752, 757, 117 Cal. Rptr. 662, 668 (1974) with Brock, 66 Cal. 2d at 656, 426 P.2d at
902, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 332. The language in Matson, borrowed from Brock stated, "joinder of
related charges . .. ordinarily avoids needless harassment of the defendant and the waste of
public funds which may result if the same general facts were to be tried twice in two or more
separate trials." (emphasis added) Id.
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severance motion. 10 3 Despite having determined that on the facts
before it that there were no significant additional benefits under
Matson, the court looked to the other side of the balance and
considered possible additional prejudice to the defendant from join-
der.104
c. Prejudicial Circumstances
The court in Williams considered three possible forms of prejudice
other than noncross-admissibility to which a defendant might be
subjected when crimes are joined under section 954. They are: (1)
The possible inflammatory nature of one or more of the joined
charges and the resultant prejudicial effect that might have on the
jury, (2) the possibility that one or more of the joined has particularly
weak evidentiary support in relation to the others, and (3) whether
one or more of the joined charges carries the death penalty. 10 The
Williams court adopted this stage of its analysis from the District
Court of Appeals case of Coleman v. Superior Court'06 which had
found the above three forms of prejudice evident on the facts before
it when ruling on the propriety of a trial court's severance ruling. 107
The Williams court applied the same analysis to the facts surrounding
the two murders, beginning with the possible inflammatory nature
of the murder charges.108
103. See supra note 96 (the term "connected in their commission" is not exact, so Williams'
holding on additional benefits remains unclear).
104. See infra notes 105-24 and accompanying text.
105. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 452-54, 683 P.2d at 706-07, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
106. 116 Cal. App. 3d. 129, 130-35, 172 Cal. Rptr. 86, 86-88 (1981).
107. Id. In Coleman, the defendant was charged with sex crimes against two minors and
the rape and murder of an adult woman. Id. The charges were consolidated under the joinder
provision of section 954 as crimes of the same class. Id. In addition to finding that the joined
charges were not cross-admissible, the court pointed out three other prejudicial circumstances.
Id. First, joining the murder charge with the sex charges against the children was unfair,
because of the inflammatory nature of the sex charges. Id. Second, the murder charge had
very little evidentiary support compared with the other charges, thus causing evidence from
the stronger charges to spill over and make the murder charge appear stronger. Id. Finally, a
conviction for the murder could have resulted in the death penalty. Id. Like Coleman, the
court in Williams considered prejudicial circumstances in addition to the prejudice inherent in
lack of cross-admissibility. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 452-54, 683 P.2d at 705-06, 204 Cal. Rptr.
at 706-07. The court undertook this analysis despite having found no "additional benefits"
under the Matson rule. Id. Perhaps the court did not need to show additional prejudice to
show abuse of discretion; rather, the Williams court discussed additional prejudice for the
sake of establishing a clear methodology for its balancing test. Id. Cf. People v. Smallwood,
42 Cal. 3d 415, 426, 722 P.2d 197, 215, 228 Cal. Rptr. 913, 919 (1986) (absent additional
benefits under Matson, lack of cross-admissibility alone may be sufficient to show substantial
prejudice).
108. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 452-54, 683 P.2d at 705-06, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 706-07.
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1. Inflammatory Nature
Under the facts of Williams, the court said that joinder of two
crimes, both of which shared characteristics of gang activity, was
prejudicial to the defendant for two reasons.
1°9 First, since the
defendant was a gang member, a jury might automatically have
assumed that the defendant must have been involved in both crimes
simply because he was a gang member.
110 Second, the court said that
gang membership itself was an inflammatory phenomenon because
of the negative publicity which surrounds it."' The court was careful
to point out that crimes prejudicing a defendant because of their
inflammatory nature were not limited to those involving gang mem-
bership or the facts of Coleman which involved sex crimes against
children.12 The court next considered the relative strengths of the
two charges.
2. Strong and Weak Cases
The Williams court agreed with the court in Coleman that when
a charge with strong evidentiary support is joined with a weakly
supported charge, a "spill-over" effect may occur, causing the weakly
supported charge to appear stronger than it really is."
3 The result is
that the strength of the strong charge helps bring a conviction in the
weaker charge where a conviction may not have been obtained in
separate trials." 4 The* court in Williams expanded upon Coleman,
however, by including within the category of prejudice situations in
which any or all charges joined are weak."
5 The court in Williams
determined that the evidence supporting William's guilt was weak
with respect to both murder charges."
6 The court then reasoned that
joinder of two weak cases is just as prejudicial as joinder of strong
109. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 452-53, 683 P.2d at 606, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
110. Id. This reasoning has a potentially broad application. For example, an 
argument
could be made that the "inflammatory nature" part of the Williams test would be satisfied 
if
a black or an asian was the defendant and a different witness from each joined charge 
could
testify that the perpetrator was of the same race.
111. Id. at 453, 683 P.2d at 605, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
112. Id.
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and weak cases. 117 The weak cases may appear stronger than they
really are when all of the evidence is viewed in the aggregate.'
3. Capital Offenses
The Williams court considered as a final determinant of prejudice
that one of the crimes charged was a capital offense." 9 The court
reasoned that since capital crimes result in the ultimate punishment,
they require a higher degree of scrutiny in determining prejudice,
especially if one of the above two forms of prejudice is also present. 2 0
The court stressed as particularly intolerable, joinder of two noncap-
ital crimes that become capital merely by virtue of joinder.' 2 1 Cali-
fornia Penal Code section 190.2 provides that multiple murders may
be considered a capital offense because of the creation of special
circumstances. 12However, section 190.2 requires that both charged
murders result in convictions before special circumstances will be
present. 23 According to the Williams court, joinder of two non-
capital murder charges makes a multiple conviction under section
190.2 far more likely because of impermissible character inferences
and a jury's tendancy to aggregate and misallocate the evidence
between the charges. 124
The two step analysis, or balancing test, set out by the Williams
court as a means of ruling on or reviewing section 954 severance
motions seems straight forward in theory. However, each stage of
the analysis resulted in rather broad holdings by the Williams court,
subjecting the entire analysis to a considerable breadth of plausible
117. Id.
118. Id. The court concluded that had the charges been tried separately, it is possible that
neither charge would have supported a conviction. Id.
119. Id. at 454-55, 683 P.2d at 707, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
120. Id. Higher scrutiny is required than when ruling on severance motions involving non-capital crimes because a capital crime carries the ultimate punishment. Id. Rather than providing
a ground for prejudice, the presence of a capital offense signals the need for greater sensitivity
to prejudice. Id. Cf. e.g. Newman v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 377, 384, 224 Cal.Rptr. 538, 542 (1986) (non-cross-admissiblity and other prejudice more acceptable if no
possibility of the death penalty).
121. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 454, 683 P.2d at 707, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
122. Id. "The defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more that one offense
of murder in the first or second degree." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(3) (West 1988). Petitionerwould face multiple murder special circumstances (warranting possible death penalty) under
the above subdivision only if the charges were joined for trial. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 454
n.11, 589 P.2d at 707 n.11, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 708 n.11.
123. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 454, 683 P.2d at 707, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
124. Id.
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applications. 12 A look at Williams' possible holdings is useful before
looking at subsequent applications of the Williams balancing test by
the supreme court.
3. Williams' Holding
The Williams decision made clear that section 954 must be consid-
ered in its totality. 126 Cross-admissibility is vital as the first deter-
minant of prejudicial joinder because if joined charges are cross-
admissible, proper joinder is presumed.
27 When charges are not
cross-admissible, the defendant has the burden of showing that
substantial prejudice would result from joinder.
12s In the broadest
sense, Williams may be understood to suggest that absent cross-
admissibility, substantial prejudice will be satisfied if the additional
benefits of joinder laid out in Matson are not present.
29 The reason
is that joinder of noncross-admissible charges is itself highly preju-
dicial. 30 Construed more narrowly, the opinion can be read as holding
that, absent both cross-admissibility and any additional benefits, the
defendant must still prove the existence of at least one of the three
bases of prejudice laid out above.131 This holding is possible because
125. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (Williams is unclear as to how pivotal
cross-admissibility is as used in determining substantial prejudice because Williams neither
defines additional benefits under the Matson exception nor indicates how many, if any, of the
additional prejudicial circumstances enumerated in Coleman were necessary to offset those
additional benefits).
126. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 447-49, 683 P.2d at 701-03, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 703-04.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See People v. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d 35, 41, 528 P.2d 752, 756, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 664,
668 (1974). See also supra, note 92 (additional benefits, added to the probative value side of
the balance are required just to offset prejudice inherent in joining non-cross-admissible).
Without additional benefits of joinder present to bolster probative value, the court theoretically
should not have to search for additional prejudice beyond that inherent in the lack of cross-
admissibility. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d at 41, 528 P.2d at 757, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
130. See, e.g., People v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 426, 722 P.2d 197, 208, 228 Cal.
Rptr. at 913, 919 (1986) (non cross-admissibility is alone prejudicial without any additional
prejudice). See also supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (limitations on admitting evidence
of other crimes and dangers therein); supra note 92 (Matson implied that lack of additional
benefits alone is sufficient to show substantial prejudice when charges are not part of same
transaction or cross-admissible).
131. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d 451-54, 683 P.2d at 704-07, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 706-08 (1984).
Having found no additional benefits under Matson, the court in Williams proceeded to consider
additional prejudice. Id. The purpose of this part of the opinion may have been merely to
drive home the existence of substantial prejudice an attempt to provide a clear model of the
balancing test for other courts to follow. However, the analysis of additional prejudice may
have been recognition by the court that there is always some benefit to joinder which must
be offset with additional prejudice. The court in Williams did not make this clear. Id.
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the court, despite having concluded that no additional benefits were
present under the Matson rule, nevertheless searched for additional
prejudice to the defendant beyond that inherent in the lack of cross-
admissibility. 32
Further, although, the Williams court provided for joinder of
noncross-admissible crimes which does not subject a defendant to
substantial prejudice, the court failed to specify what degree of
factual similarity is necessary between joined charges before the state
may claim "additional benefits" under Matson.' The Williams court
held that unless a defendant has elected for a joint trial, or separate
trials would result in a waste of public funds because of substantial
duplication of evidence, joinder of noncross-admissible charges does
not produce any legitimate benefits.1 4 Any lesser economic benefits
of joinder are apparently outweighed by greater concerns of prejudice
to the defendant and do not justify joinder under sectiom 954.13-1
The court in Williams implied that joined charges would have to be
connected in their commission before evidence would be sufficiently
duplicated that the state could claim additional benefits under Mat-
son. 13 6 However, the term "connected in their commission" is not
exact, and as a result, the Williams court did not provide a functional
defimition of additional benefits under Matson.'37 Finally, Williams
should not be read as purporting to limit possible "prejudicial
circumstances" to those enumerated in Coleman, since prejudice takes
many forms. 38 The lack of specificity by the Williams court invited
these extremely broad and narrow interpretations of its balancing
test in subsequent decisions, resulting in a continually divided supreme
132. Id.
133. Id. at 451-52, 683 P.2d at 705, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
134. Id.
135. Id. When joinder does not serve to avoid duplication of evidence, lesser claims of
judicial economy are overiding more fundamental issues of justice, such as defendant's right
to a fair trial. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. See supra notes 32 and 96-97 ("connected in their commission" usually means
that crimes are either cross-admissible or part of the same criminal transaction but has not
been limited to these situations).
138. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 452, 683 P.2d at 706, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 707. The determinants
of prejudice applied by the Williams court were adopted directly from Coleman v. Superior
Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 129, 138-39, 172 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (1981). The Coleman court found
those particular prejudicial circumstances to exist under a certain set of facts; different facts
will no doubt give rise to different but equally severe forms of prejudice. Id. But see People
v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 174, 711 P.2d 480, 511, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 198 (1985) (few
crimes will be considered "inflammatory" under the Williams standard because of their
repulsive or sensational nature).
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court and inconsistent decisions. 139 In particular, the failure of the
Williams court to define clearly the limits of the Matson exception,
allowed that exception to swallow the Williams standard.
140
III. THE PARA_&mTERS OF WILLMMS UNDER THE BIRD COURT
A. People v. Balderas
Less than a year after Williams was decided, the California Su-
preme Court opened the floodgates to the Matson exception in
deciding People v. Balderas1 41 In Balderas, the court sustained the
trial court's denial of a defendant's severance motion, despite the
lack of cross-admissibility and the presence of a capital crime.
42
Balderas, the defendant, was found guilty of kidnapping, robbing
and murdering one victim.' 43 He was found guilty of kidnapping,
robbing, raping and sodomizing two other victims in an unrelated
attack.144 The crimes occurred within a twenty-four hour period and
were, according to the court, properly joinable under section 954 as
crimes of the same class and as ones connected in their commission.
45
Two principal witnesses and two medical experts were common to
139. See Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 445, 454, 683 P.2d at 700, 708, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 701,
708 (seven justices concurred in the method used by the court in reviewing the severance
motion and the result). In contrast, both Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 144, 711 P.2d at 480, 222
Cal. Rptr. at 184 and Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 433436, 722 P.2d 197, 209-11, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 913, 925-27 (1986), resulted in 4-3 rulings with respect to severance issues, even though
both cases purported to follow Williams. See also infra notes 141-98 and accompanying text
(broad applications of Williams in subsequent Bird court decisions).
140. See Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 711 P.2d 480, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184. See also infra notes
221-46 and accompanying text (application of additional benefits in Lucas court decisions).
Under Matson, a judge's discretion in admitting other crimes' evidence is broader under Penal
Code section 954 than Evidence Code section 1101(b) if there are "additional benefits" from
joinder. People v. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d 35, 41, 528 P.2d 752, 756, 117 Cal. Rptr. 664, 668.
(1974). Although the Williams court found no additional benefits present on the facts before
it, the court did not indicate how closely charges must be connected before Matson benefits
are realized. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 449-54, 589 P.2d at 703-06, 204 Cal. Rptr at 704-08.
Neither did the court indicate the extent to which the Coleman prejudice factors must be
present to offset any Matson benefits. Id.
141. 41 Cal. 3d 144, 711 P.2d 480, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1985). See infra notes 166-77 and
accompanying text (ramifications of Balderas).
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both crimes. 146 The court applied the Williams standard to the facts
before it.147
1. Cross-admissibility
In line with the analysis used by the supreme court in Williams,
the Balderas court began with a determination of cross-admissibi-
lity.'4 The court held that the charges were noncross-admissible,
rejecting the state's argument that the crimes shared a sufficient
number of common characteristics to resolve the disputed identity of
the perpetrator. 149 The court then undertook the next stage of the
Williams analysis and balanced the "additional benefits" of joinder
to the prosecution against possible prejudice to the defendant. 5 0
2. Benefits of Joinder
The Balderas court extended legal limitations on additional benefits
of noncross-admissible charges implied by the court in Williams.,"
146. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 174-75, 711 P.2d at 494-95, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
147. Id. at 170-78, 711 P.2d at 491-94, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 195-98.
148. Id. at 171-73, 711 P.2d at 492-94, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 196-97.
149. Id. The crimes shared a great deal by way of common features toward showing the
modus operandi of the perpetrator, and thereby resolving his disputed identity. Id. The
incidents occurred within twenty-four hours, both involved commandeering of vehicles, theuse of a shotgun, and the partial or complete disrobing of the victims. Id. Though the Balderas
court ultimately found the charges were not cross-admissible, because crimes were not similar
enough to prove a modus operandi, its decision on review was based only on the facts whichwere known at the time of the pre-trial severance hearing. Id. A defendant's motion to sever
charges which have been consolidated under section 954 is usually heard some time prior totrial. Id. In Balderas, the trial court had determined, on the facts known at the time of thepre-trial hearing, that the charges were cross-admissible as to identity. Id. However, thedefendant conceded identity between the time of the pretrial severance motion and the trial.
Id. As a result, the defendant's identity was no longer "in dispute" for purposes of cross-
admissibility under Evidence Code section 1101(b). Id. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying
text (requirements of cross-admissibility). Nevertheless, the Balderas court held that it could
only review the propriety of joinder on the facts known at the time of the pre-trial hearing.
Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 171, 711 P.2d at 492, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 196. Cf. People v. Duval,198 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 244 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1988); People v. Polecat, 191 Cal. App. 3d 526,236 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1987) (on post-trial review of a trial court's severance motion, error from
joinder should be predicated on events which occurred at trial rather than only on the facts
known at the time of the pre-trial motion).
150. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 173-76, 711 P.2d 480, 493-95, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 197-99.
151. See Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 457, 683 P.2d at 709, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 710 (Goldstein,J., dissenting). The dissent believed that by implying the state could not claim additional
benefits of joinder under Matson when crimes were not connected in their commission, thecourt in Williams limited the legal definition of joinable crimes under the wording of section
954 itself. Id. After Williams, crimes that are in the same "class" but not "connected in their
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Regarding the economic benefit to the state in avoiding duplicative
evidence by joining charges, the court first found the joined charges
to be connected in their commission, even though the crimes were
neither cross-admissibile nor part of the same transaction.
5 2 The
Balderas court used the term "connected in their commission" more
broadly than the court in Williams had implied it could be, but
reasoned that because of common witnesses and medical experts
testifying on both charges, the economy of a single trial was signif-
icant.5 3 Although this finding extended limitations implied by the
court in Williams, the Williams decision did not preclude the inter-
pretation by the Balderas court.154 Balderas provided the first real
example of legitimate "additional benefits" under the Matson rule
limited by Williams.1 5. Since Williams had no opportunity on its facts
to determine what degree of overlapping evidence between joined
charges would give rise to a claim of additional benefits by the state,
and also failed to provide a clear legal limitation, the Balderas court
was a pioneer in this part of the Williams analysisY.
1 6 As a result,
commission" arguably may not even be joined. Id. Although the court in Williams impliedly
limited crimes "legally" joinable under section 954 to ones connected in their commission, 
the
term "connected in their commission" is itself ambiguous. See supra note 96 and accompanying
text (although Williams implied that crimes must be part of a single criminal transaction or
cross-admissible to be connected in their commission, prior supreme court cases have used 
the
term more loosely).
The Balderas court also determined that the crimes were "connected together in their
commission" for purposes of satisfying the joinder provision of section 954, because they
shared two "commom elements of substantial importance" under the rule established in
Matson. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d. at 171, 711 P.2d at 492, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 196. In Balderas,
the common elements shared by the original charges were: (1) both involved use of a shotgun
and (2) both involved an intent to obtain property feloniously. Id. But see, supra note 32 (the
Balderas court applied the term inconsistently with Williams and other cases which only found
crimes connected in their commission when they had some amount of overlapping evidence).
Since the Balderas decision stretched the term "connected in their commission" beyond 
its
traditional meaning, any implied legal limitation by the Williams decision on when additional
benefits under Matson will be significant becomes rather meaningless, because most crimes
can now be said to be connected in their commission. Newman v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.
App. 3d 377, 387, 224 Cal. Rptr. 538, 543 (1986).
152. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 171, 711 P.2d at 497, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
153. Id. In fact, the crimes were so closely connected in time (eight hours), that the court
considered one to be in the aftermath of the other. Id. Cf supra, note 96 (crimes were very
nearly "connected in their commission" as satisfying "same transaction" joinder under
Williams).
154. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (Williams neither expressly limited
Matson nor convincingly limited crimes connected in their commission to ones that were cross-
admissible or part of the same transaction).
155. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 174, 711 P.2d at 498, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
156. Id. Cf. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 451, 683 P.2d at 705, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 706. The
California Supreme Court in Williams compared the facts before it with those in People v.
Brock, 66 Cal. 2d 645, 649, 426 P.2d 889, 896, 58 Cal. Rptr. 321, 327 (1967), when dealing
with the question of how much duplication of evidence was necessary to realize "additional
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Balderas was the first supreme court case following Williams in which
joined crimes, though not cross-admissible, share sufficient evidence
that judicial economy from joinder must theoretically be offset by
additional prejudice.1 17
3. Prejudice from Joinder
The court next searched the facts for the existence of any of the
prejudicial circumstances adopted by Williams from Coleman.'58 The
court considered the strong versus weak factor and inflammatory
nature of the charges, but summarily dismissed them as nonpreju-
dicial on the facts before it.159 The Balderas court found that neither
of the joined charges had weak evidentiary support. 60 With regard
to the possible inflammatory effect of a rape and a robbery/murder
on the jury, the court implied that a valid claim of prejudice derived
from joinder of inflammatory crimes might be limited to crimes
involving strong public outcry, such as the crimes in Williams and
Coleman.'6' The Balderas court noted that the charges before it, in
contrast, were the result of the defendant's personal motive rather
than the highly publicized crimes involving gang warfare in Williams
or child molestation in Coleman.6 2 The court concluded that crimes
of an inherently inflammatory nature would be difficult to find in
our present era of extraordinary violence.' 63 The Williams court had
benefits" under Matson. Id. Brock involved two burglaries, occurring close together in time,
and stolen property from both was found in the defendant's room. Brock, 66 Cal. 2d at 649,426 P.2d at 892, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 324. Further, the crimes were connected in their commission.
Id. Balderas involved approximately the same amount of duplicative testimony as Brock, even
though the Balderas crimes were not connected in their commission. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at
163-65, 711 P.2d at 492, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 190-92. Therefore, Williams and Balderas may be
called factually consistent with one another even though not legally consistent. See also People
v. Johnson, 43 Cal. 3d 296, 326, 730 P.2d 131, 150, 233 Cal. Rptr. 562, 582 (1987) (Bird,
C.J., concurring) ("additional benefits" based on facts of Brock).
157. See People v. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d 35, 41, 528 P.2d 752, 757, 117 Cal. Rptr. 664, 668(1974) (if there are additional benefits from joinder, prejudice from non cross-admissible alone
is insufficient to compel severance).





163. Id. The court stated that "[b]y the sad standards of the 70's and 80's, [the crimes]
were not particularly brutal, repulsive, or sensational." Id. This statement has been quoted
consistently by the supreme court and lower courts alike in subsequent cases rejecting argumentsthat certain joined charges are particularly inflammatory. See People v. Crosby, 197 Cal. App.
3d 853, 858 243 Cal. Rptr. 158, 161 (1988) (rape of one adult joined with rape of one minor
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expressly rejected this contention. 164 Finally, the Balderas court gave
little weight to the fact that the murder charge was a capital crime
and held that capital crimes which were not cross-admissible could
still be joined.
165
4. The "Watered Down" Williams
The Balderas court interpreted Williams narrowly by limiting Wil-
liams to its facts. es By reaffirming Matson, the Williams court agreed
that under some circumstances, economic benefits justify joinder of
noncross-admissible crimes. 6 7 Williams implied that these circum-
stances might be limited to situations where joined charges were part
of a single criminal transaction but did not say so expressely1 68
Balderas broadened this ambiguity by holding that the state has a
valid claim of additional benefits under Matson when noncross-
admissible crimes have overlapping evidence or witnesses, even though
the charges are not part of the same transaction. 69 The Balderas
court also limited Williams by downplaying the importance of higher
not "inflammatory" under Balderas test.); Newman v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 384,
389, 224 Cal. Rptr. 538, 541 (1986) (two rapes not especially inflammatory under the Balderas
standard); See also People v. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d 589, 749 P.2d 854, 244 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1988)
(joined murder charges for deaths of two former wives of defendant not considered inflam-
matory) inflammatory); People v. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 760 P.2d 996, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467
(1988) (hammer killing not inflammatory under Balderas standard). Cf. People v. Johnson,
43 Cal. 3d 296, 317, 730 P.2d 131, 155, 233 Cal. Rptr. 562, 584 (1987) (Bird, J., concurring)
(rape of a white woman by a black man in a church should have been considered "inflam-
matory" when joined with a murder; the brutality of the rape itself was inflammatory). The
effect of the broad language of this statement by the Balderas court is that arguably no crime
is inflammatory by virtue of its gory or repulsive nature. See Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 941, 760
P.2d at 1008, 251 Cal. Rptr. 479 (crimes will only be considered inflammatory if they are
inflammatory in relation to each other).
164. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 452, 683 P.2d at 706, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 707. The court in
Williams said, in finding gang membership inflammatory, "It would be folly to suggest that
we should limit the consideration of prejudicial impact of a joint trial to to cases which
involve sexual assaults against minors." Id.
165. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 172, 711 P.2d at 505, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
166. Id. at 171-81, 711 P.2d at 504-13, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 196-202. Cf. Newman v. Superior
Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 377, 385, 224 Cal. Rptr. 538, 543 (1986) (Poche, J., concurring).
"People v. Balderas has ... in my view, watered down Williams v. Superior Court to the
point that no longer will trial court decisions on severance motions be subject to any genuine
appellate review. Instead, such decisions will be upheld on the basis of boilerplate paragraphs."
Id.
167. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 450, 683 P.2d at 705, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 706 (1984) (when
joined charges are connected in their commission, sharing enough overlapping evidence that
the state realizes legitimate economic benefit from their joinder).
168. Id.
169. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 174-75, 711 P.2d at 494-95, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
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scrutiny when capital crimes are involved,'170 and by restricting the
category of inflammatory crimes to those with high negative pub-
licity. 171
The Balderas opinion can nevertheless be reconciled with Williams
since Williams' generality makes this possible. 72 In fact, Balderas
can be seen as completing a standard that Williams carelessly left
incomplete. Balderas accomplished this by answering the open ques-
tion of what degree of similarity between joined charges satisfies
"additional benefits" under Matson.73 Balderas had the opportunity
to rule on this open question because of the nature of the facis
before it.174 Unfortunately, the primary effect of the example set by
Balderas was to dilute Williams and render the balancing test inef-
fective. 17- Finally, the Balderas court's inattention to the need for
170. Id. at 177, 711 P.2d at 499, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
171. Id. at 174, 711 P.2d at 497, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
172. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. The court in Williams did not clearly define
its understanding of "additional benefits" when it implied that they must be connected in
their commission, and the way in which Balderas interpreted crimes connected in their
commission is consistent with the interpretation given in the California Supreme Court case
of People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 492, 341 P.2d 679, 706 (1959). Id.
173. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 174, 711 P.2d at 505, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 198. Since Williams
failed to define when noncross-admissible charges could be joined, Balderas may be seen as
providing this definition by virtue of being the first post Williams case to find additional
benifits under Matson sufficient on the facts before it. Id. Moreover, Balderas involved charges
so closely connected by time and witnesses, that substantial economy could be gained with
minimal prejudice. Id. at 163-67, 711 P.2d at 489-91, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 191-93. If properly
limited to its facts, Balderas can be seen as providing an example of a justifiable exception to
the policy argument that noncross-admissible charges that are not part of a single transaction
should never be joined. In circumstances where charges as closely connected as those in
Balderas are neither cross-admissible nor part of the same criminal transaction, perhaps joinder
is justified. This kind of situation will be an exception, however, because usually cross-
admissibility or same transaction joinder will be established with crimes so closely related. See
supra notes 39 and 96 (examples of same transaction joinder and ways in which crimes may
be cross-admissible) Unfortunately, the cost to the defendant of this exception created by
Balderas has been great. See also infra notes 199-264 and accompanying text (Lucas court has
been able to stretch Balderas and Matson exception to make Williams analysis apply to fact
situations where there are no similarities between joined charges). The small amount of extra
time and money which would be spent if all crimes which were not either cross-admissible or
part of the same transaction were per se severable at the defendant's option, seems well
justified in light of the great potential for abuse by courts of the small exception in Balderas.
174. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 174-75, 711 P.2d at 495-97, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 198 (the crimes
joined in Balderas had some common witnesses that satisfied requirement of additional benefits
under Matson).
175. See, e.g., Newman v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 377, 224 Cal. Rptr. 538
(1986). Newman was decided shortly after Balderas and involved two rape charges that were
joined under section 954, but unlike Balderas, had no shared evidence or witnesses. Id. Neither
were the joined charges cross-admissible. Id. The concurring justice in Newman best described
the effect of Balderas on Newman when he said,
Balderas has.., watered down Williams to the point that no longer will trial court
decisions on severance motions be subject to any genuine appellate review. Instead,
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heightened sensitivity when capital charges are joined, and its limi-
tation on possible inflammatory circumstances was contrary to Wil-
liams and lessened the relative weight to be afforded them.1 76 The
supreme court next had an opportunity to apply the diluted Williams
analysis to severance ruling in People v. Smallwood.77
B. People v. Smallwood.
The California Supreme Court carried Williams to the opposite
extreme of Balderas when it decided People v. Smallwood in 1986.178
Defendant Smallwood was charged with two counts of first degree
murder . 79 The two killings occurred eight months apart and shared
very little common testimony at the time of the pretrial severance
motion. 180 One murder charge had significantly more evidentiary
support than the other. 181 The defendant was found guilty of both
murders, each of which carried the death penalty. 182 The court ruled
that the defendant had been substantially prejudiced from joinder.'83
Applying the Williams analysis, the court found the charges non-
cross-admissible.8 4 The Smallwood court then implicitely curbed the
such decisions will be upheld on the basis of boiler plate paragraphs.
That is not to say that I believe that due process will not be served by trying these
unrelated, and not cross-admissible, rape charges together, or that judicial economy
is served by a consolidated trial: the evidence simply is not overlapping. (emphasis
added)
Id. at 385, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 543 (Poche, J., concurring). See also infra notes 200-36 and
accompanying text (the decision in Balderas has allowed the Williams analysis to be adapted
to almost any factual situation).
176. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 171, 174, 711 P.2d at 502, 505, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 196, 198
(1985). See, e.g., People v. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 931, 760 P.2d 996, 1009, 251 Cal. Rptr.
467, 479 (1988) (inflammatory crimes must be inflammatory in relation to each other to be
prejudicial); People v. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d 589, 606-08, 749 P. 2d 854, 860-61, 244 Cal. Rptr.
207-08 (1987) (joined crimes not inflammatory because neither gang warfare nor child moles-
tation present; the capital nature of the charges is not important unless charges become capital
by virtue of joinder).
177. 42 Cal. 3d 415, 722 P.2d 197, 228 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1986).
178. Id. See infra notes 185-98 and accompanying text (contrasting Balderas and Small-
wood).
179. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d at 418-24, 722 P.2d at 198-202, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 914-18.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 430, 722 P.2d at 206, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 922. The court ruled that the evidence
that defendant Smallwood was the killer in the second of the two murders was very weak. Id.
An alleged eyewitness proved to be uncredible. Id.
182. Id. at 417, 722 P.2d at 198, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 914 (The murders qualified as "felony
murders"-ones committed during a felony. Id. Such killings carry a death penalty pursuant
to California Penal Code section 190.2 Id.
183. Id. at 429, 722 P.2d at 205, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
184. Id. at 428-30, 722 P.2d at 203-07, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 919-23.
1263
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
decision in Balderas by spending three pages of the opinion offering
strong policy arguments against joinder of noncross-admissible
charges.' 85 The court indicated that if the charges were not cross-
admissible, joinder under section 954 would seldom produce legiti-
mate additional benefits. 18 6 The court then held that although non
cross-admissible charges could still be joined, the prosecution would
have to prove real, not merely theoretical economic benefits from
joinder if it sought to overide prejudice to the defendant.' 87 The
Smallwood court held that there are no presumed benefits from
joinder; rather, additional benefits will vary with each case, and are
entirely dependant upon the amount of overlapping evidence between
joined charges. 188 Finally, contrary to Balderas, the court stressed the
need for extreme scrutiny in any death penalty case. 8 9
The court in Smallwood based its finding of substantial prejudice
primarily on a lack of any additional benefits from joinder, coupled
with prejudice to the defendant inherent in the noncross-admissibity
of the crimes. 190 The presense of additional prejudicial circumstances,
namely, the fact that the death penalty was involved and that one
charge was particularly weak, solidified the appellant's argument for
substantial prejudice but does not appear to have been decisive. 91
185. Id. at 426-33, 722 P.2d at 207-11, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 923-27 (joinder of noncross-
admissible charges is highly prejudicial and ensures that otherwise inadmissible evidence (barred
by Evidence Code section 1101(a)) comes before the jury).
186. Id. at 430, 722 P.2d at 207, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 923. The court stated: "[als the two
offenses were not cross-admissible, there simply was no significant judicial economy to be
gained from joinder." Id.
187. Id. at 425, 722 P. 2d at 203, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 431, 722 P.2d at 207, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
190. Id. at 430, 722 P.2d at 206, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 922-23. The Smallwood court did not
indicate when noncross-admissible crimes could be joined, because the court had no occasion
to judge the potential judicial economy in its own case. Id. The prosecutor never argued that
judicial economy would be promoted by joinder. Id. The court in Smallwood warned, however,
"no longer may a court merely recite public policy favoring joinder or presume judicial
economy to justify denial of severance." Id. at 425, 722 P.2d at 203, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
See also, People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 182, 711 P.2d 480, 498, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 202
(1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (denial of severance improper even with the great deal of
evidence shared between the Balderas crimes).
191. Smallwood at 429-31, 722 P.2d at 206-07, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 922-23. With regard to
the issue of a capital charge, the court stated: "[e]ven if such an ill-considered ruling were
justifiable in a less serious case, it was impossible where questions of life and death were at
stake." (emphasis added) Id. Further, although one of the murder charges was weak, the
charge had strengthened by the time of trial due to a new witness. Id. In line with Balderas,
though, the court based its review only on the facts available at the time of the severance
motion. Id. The Smallwood court, however, took note of events during the trial, stating that
the strengthening of the prosecution's case between the time of the pre-trial severance hearing
and the time of trial would not have changed the finding of substantial prejudice, because the
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The Smallwood decision was the first interpretation of Williams
which actually seemed to condition defensible joinder of noncross-
admissible crimes on the state's ability to prove substantial economic
benefit. 92 The court in Smallwood implied that the burden was still
on the defendant to show substantial prejudice from joinder. 193 But,
the court seemed to imply that when joined crimes are not cross-
admissible, substantial prejudice would be shown more by the state's
failure to substantiate joinder with economic benefits than by the
defendant's ability to prove the additional forms of prejudice set out
in Coleman. 94
The court in Smallwood interpreted Williams to the opposite
extreme from the court in Balderas.'95 The Smallwood court may
have hoped to curb the widening of the Matson exception created
new witness was less than credible. Id. From the majority opinion, it is difficult to infer
whether the court would have ruled differently, had the charges been sufficiently strong by
the time of trial to negate the "weakness factor" of one of the murder charges. Id. But see,
id. at 434-35, 722 P. 2d at 210, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 926 (Lucas, J., dissenting) (although an
erroneous ruling on a pretrial severance motion may signify an abuse of discretion by the trial
court, that erroneous ruling does not justify reversal of a conviction unless a post trial review
shows that the error resulted in substantial prejudice at trial). Particularly noteworthy is the
statement by the court that noncross-admissibility between joined charges is itself prejudicial
to the defendant and must be offset by additional benefits. Id. at 426, 722 P. 2d at 203, 228
Cal. Rptr. at 919. This statement lends support to an argument that absent cross-admissibility
or proven additional benefits between joined charges, joinder may be substantially prejudicial
even without the presense any of the additional forms of prejudice set out in Coleman. Cf.
Id. at 433-36, 722 P.2d at 209-11, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 925-27 (Lucas, J., dissenting) (Lucas
attacks the majority, saying the majority misread Williams in placing so much importance on
cross-admissibility in determining substantial prejudice). Interestingly, though, Broussard, who
wrote the majority opinion in Williams, concurred entirely in the majority opinion in Small-
wood. Id. at 433, 722 P.2d at 209, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
192. Id. at 426-32, 711 P.2d at 204-07, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 920-23 (entire emphasis on
prosecution failure to support joinder with proof of real economic benefits to the state in the
face of prejudice to the defendant due to noncross-admissibility).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. At one extreme, Williams can be seen as supporting a rule that noncross-admissible
crimes should always be severed when they are not part of a single transaction, even if there
are no additional prejudicial circumstances such as inflammatory or capital charges. Williams
v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 451, 683 P.2d 699, 706, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 707 (1984).
This appears to be where Smallwood stands. See supra notes 129 and accompanying text
(broadest possible reading of Williams). At another extreme, Williams can support a rule that
noncross-admissible charges may be joined if they share only similar characteristics, such as
an intent to obtain property feloniously, and need not be severed unless the defendant proves
all four of the additional prejudicial circumstances set out in Coleman. See People v. Balderas,
41 Cal. 3d 144, 171, 711 P.2d 480, 492, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 196 (1985) (Balderas used the
term "connected in their commission" more loosely than had the court in Williams) and
Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 453-54, 683 P.2d at 706-07, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08 (Williams did
not indicate how many of the additional forms of prejudice adopted from Coleman must be
present to show substantial prejudice from joinder, but found all of them present on the facts
before it).
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by the decision in Balderas.196 However, the Smallwood court had
no opportunity to do so, because the prosecution in Smallwood never
claimed any additional benefits with which to justify its denial of
the defendant's severance motion.197 Purportedly sustaining the de-
cisions in both Balderas and Smallwood, the Williams standard
became so malleable that trial courts had no standard at all by which
to determine the propriety of joinder under section 954.198
IV. THE PARAMETERS OF Williams Under The Lucas Court
While District Courts of Appeal battled with the proper application
of Williams following the inconsistent decisions in Balderas and
Smallwood, the new Lucas court embarked on further variations of
the shapeless Williams standard.' 99 Two 1988 Lucas court decisions
may fairly well indicate the shape of Williams to come.
A. People v. Ruiz
In People v. Ruiz,200 the defendant was charged with murdering
three former wives, and sentenced to death.2,0 There were no witnesses
196. Justice Bird, who dissented on the severance issues in Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 144,
711 P.2d at 480, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 184 (Bird C.J., dissenting), wrote the majority opinion in
Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d at 415, 722 P.2d at 197, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
197. Smallwood, 41 Cal. 3d at 431, 722 P.2d at 207, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 923 (the prosecutor
arguing for denial of severance in Smallwood did not even make an attempt to show additional
benefits).
198. See Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 457, 683 P.2d at 708, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 710 (Goldstein,
J., dissenting). "The result is that the trial courts are left without a usable standard as to
when a reviewing court will find an otherwise statutorily proper joinder to be intolerably
prejudicial." Id. Cf. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d at 434, 722 P.2d at 209, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 925
(Lucas, J., dissenting). "The majority magically transmutes an element guaranteeing proper
joinder into a prerequisite to proper joinder." Id. But see People v. Crosby, 197 Cal. App.
3d 853, 860, 243 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163 (1988) (Smallwood is consistent with Balderas and
Williams).
199. Compare Crosby, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 853, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 158 (court denied
severance where charges were noncross-admissible and shared no evidence to promote judicial
economy but two totally unrelated rapes were "inflammatory") with People v. Duval, 198
Cal. App. 3d 1121, 1126-32, 244 Cal. Rptr. 522, 524-27 (1988) (trial court properly severed
two rapes upheld where defendant teacher assaulted two students under same circumstances,
based on lack of cross-admissibility). The supreme court is no clearer on severance rulings.
See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 43 Cal. 3d 296, 319-35, 730 P.2d 131, 144-155, 233 Cal. Rptr.
562, 575-86 (1987). Justices Lucas and Bird wrote separate opinions ruling on propriety of
trial court's denial of severance motion, even though the issue had been declared moot by the
majority. Id. Both opinions can be reasonably supported by a combination of Williams,
Smallwood and Balderas.
200. 44 Cal. 3d 589, 749 P.2d 854, 244 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1988).
201. Id. at 599-602, 749 P.2d at 862-64, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 203-05.
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to any of the alleged murders, and one of the bodies was never
found. 20 The only real evidence supporting the defendant's involve-
ment in the murders was his alleged lack of concern over the victims'
disappearance and resultant deaths. 203 In Ruiz, the court sustained
what it conceded was a highly questionable finding of cross-admis-
sibility by the trial court.204 The theory of a modus operandi upon
which the trial court based its finding was simply unsupported by
the evidence. 20 5
In an attempt to resolve doubts, the court considered possible
additional prejudice under the Williams balancing test.20 The court
departed from the notion in Williams that capital crimes in general
require a higher degree of scrutiny than non-capital crimes.2 7 Instead,
the Ruiz court interpreted the Williams standard as saying that extra
scrutiny is required only when two noncapital crimes would become
capital by virtue of joinder.20 8 This limited reading of Williams has
been applied in subsequent decisions of the Lucas court.M With
respect to the joined crimes' possible inflammatory nature, the court
limited that category to the facts of Williams and Coleman.210 Finally,
although claiming to employ the Williams analysis, the court in Ruiz
202. Id. at 602, 749 P.2d at 863, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 606, 749 P.2d at 861, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 207. See id. at 625-30, 749 P.2d at
874-79, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 220-25 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (crimes were not even close to
being cross-admissible).
205. Id. at 627, 749 P.2d at 875, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 605-08, 749 P.2d at 859-62, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 205-08.
207. Id.
208. Id. This was the first case in which the California Supreme Court limited Williams
to its specific facts regarding capital punishment. Id. It is in direct conflict with People v.
Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 430-31, 722 P.2d 197, 207, 228 Cal. Rptr. 913, 923. (1986)
(requiring hightened scrutiny in all capital cases, not only when crimes become capital by
virtue of joinder).
209. People v. Ruiz, 44 Cal.3d 589, 606-07, 749 P.2d 854, 861-63, 244 Cal. Rptr. 200,
207-09 (1988). See also People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 313, 753 P.2d 1082, 1090, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 886, 896 (1988); People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 393, 754 P.2d 184, 191, 247 Cal. Rptr.
137, 146 (1988) (limited readings of Williams' requirement of higher scrutiny in capital cases).
210. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 606-07, 749 P.2d at 861-63, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 207-09. If the
murders were indeed noncross-admissible (a possibility the court concedes), the fact that all
of the victims were former wives of the defendant and all disappeared under similar circum-
stances, is a source of prejudice directly analagous to the type of highly inflammatory situation
talked about in Williams a common trait of gang membership between all joined charges
coupled with the fact that the defendant was a gang member. Id. See Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at
453, 683 P.2d at 706, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 707 (warning that inflammatory crimes should not be
limited to gang membership or sex crimes against children). See also People v. Johnson, 43
Cal. 3d 296, 311-15, 730 P.2d 131, 138-40, 233 Cal. Rptr. 562, 569-71 (1987) (rape of white
woman by black man in church is inflammatory). But see People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144,
174, 711 P.2d 480, 494, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 198 (1986) (Williams may be limited to its facts).
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never mentioned any benefits of joinder.2
1 The court may have
considered them presumed.
21 2
B. People v. Bean
In its 1988 decision in People v. Bean,23 the Lucas court rendered
its first clear indication of future applications of the Williams stan-
dard.214 Bean involved two brutal murders, both beating deaths.
215 In
one murder, a hammer was used and in the other, the weapon could
not be determined. 21 6 The murders occurred three days apart, and
shared no common evidence or witness testimony.
21 7 The defendant
was sentenced to death for each murder.
218
The court purportedly applied the Williams analysis, beginning
with the issue of cross-admissibility. 2 9 The court found cross-admis-
sibility absent, but denied that severance was necessary, and pro-
ceeded to weigh the additional benefits of joinder against the
prejudicial circumstances enumerated in Williams.
220 The Bean court
gave great weight to the economic benefits of joinder.
22' However,
unlike Balderas, the crimes in Bean shared no evidence that would
support an argument for judicial economy under the Matson excep-
211. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 608, 749 P.2d at 862, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 208. The facts of the
case suggest that there was no shared testimony or physical evidence between the three murders
which would have justified a joint trial in the absence of cross-admissibility. Id. Cf. Smallwood,
42 Cal. 3d at 425, 722 P.2d at 203, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 919 (judicial economy from joinder
may no longer be presumed). The silence by the Ruiz court as to the issue of benefits of
joinder may have been because the court found the charges cross-admissible as to identity.
Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 606, 749 P.2d at 861, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 207. However, cross-admissibility
was questionable, the court admitted. Id. In light of Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d at 426, 722 P.2d
at 203, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 919 (requiring proof of real economic benefits), this conclusion
should have led the court to substantiate its determination of proper joinder by showing that
there were additional benefits under Matson. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 606, 749 P.2d at 860, 244
Cal. Rptr. at 207.
212. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 606, 749 P.2d at 861, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 207 (because the charges
were cross-admissible).
213. 46 Cal. 3d 919, 760 P.2d 996, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1988).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 927-30, 760 P.2d at 1000-03, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 471-74.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 933, 760 P.2d at 1007, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 478. In fact, the Bean court went so
far as to suggest that the dissimilarity of the evidence from the two murders tended to negate
the trial court's finding that they were committed by the same person. Id. Finally, one of the
murders was of questionable strength, due to a improper fingerprint test. Id. at 935, 760 P.2d
1008, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
218. Id. at 919, 760 P.2d at 996, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
219. Id. at 926-27, 760 P.2d at 1005-06, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 929-30, 760 P.2d at 1008, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
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tion.m The economic benefits referred to by the Bean court were
savings realized merely by virtue of a consolidated trial, benefits
considered illegitimate by the Bird court in Smallwood and other
decisions.m2 Therefore, the Bean court's uniform application of ad-
ditional benefits in the balance cannot be reconciled with the rationale
behind Smallwood-that additional benefits justifying joinder are
entirely dependant on the amount of evidence shared by joined
charges .224
Having decided that the presumed benefits of joinder were sub-
stantial, the court entertained the possibility of some additional
prejudice, although seemingly only for the sake of form.
5 First, the
fact that capital punishment was involved played no part in the
weighing process. 36Faced with the last two Williams factors, inflam-
matory and strong versus weak cases, the court quickly dispensed
with the issues as clearly cut against the defendant.
227 The court
decided that the crimes were not inflammatory with respect to each
other, presumably because neither involved gang membership or sex
crimes against children.? Contrary to Williams, and even limiting
222. Id. at 922-26, 760 P.2d at 1003-07, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 474-78. The facts indicate that
no reliable evidence and no witness testimony whatsoever was common to both crimes. Id.
223. Id. Cf. Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 451, 683 P.2d 699, 705, 204 Cal.
Rptr. 700, 706 (1984); People v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 431, 722 P.2d 197, 207, 228
Cal. Rptr. 913, 923 (1986) (economic benefits are not presumed; their strength depends entirely
on the facts of each case). Even the court in People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 711 P.2d
480, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1985) based its finding of judicial economy on the substantial amount
of duplicative evidence between the joined charges. Balderas, 41 Cal 3d at 173-74, 711 P.2d
at 494, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 198. In comparison, the Bean court simply recited the generalized
benefits of a joint trial, benefits which Williams and Smallwood would not consider significant
in light of the need for a fair trial. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 919-923, 760 P.2d at 996, 999, 251
Cal. Rptr. at 467-70.
224. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d at 426, 722 P.2d at 203, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 919 (no presumed
judicial economy from joinder).
225. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 931-36, 760 P.2d at 1006-10, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 476-80 (the court
deferred entirely to the findings of the trial court).
226. Id. But see id. at 947-53, 760 P.2d at 1021-24, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 492-95 (Broussard,
J., dissenting). Both charges carried possible death penalties, hence arguably no need for higher
scrutiny, but the jury may well not have chosen to sentence defendant to death if both murder
charges had not resulted in convictions. Id. Moreover, the chance of a double conviction was
greatly increased because one of the charges was particularly weak. Id.
227. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 934, 760 P.2d at 1008, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
228. Id. See People v. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d 589, 607, 749 P.2d 854, 862, 244 Cal. Rptr. 200,
208 (1988) (other Lucas court decision which dealt with inflammatory crimes impliedly limited
this form of prejudice to gang warfare, sex crimes against children and crimes which might
qualify as "particularly brutal or repulsive" under Balderas). Arguably, however, beating
someone to death with a hammer is repulsive by any standard. People v. Johnson, 43 Cal.
3d 296, 308, 730 P.2d 131, 139, 233 Cal. Rptr. 562, 570 (1987). Further, the fact that 
the
precise weapon was not determined in the other murder could lead a jury to infer that it too
was a hammer killing. At least the argument can be made that particularly unusual methods
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Ruiz, the court implied that a charge may not be considered inherently
inflammatory, but only in relation to another joined charge. 229 The
court did not seem to care that the evidence supporting the second
murder appeared weak.2 0 Rather, the court was unwilling to second
guess the trial court's findings that both charges were adequately
supported by the evidence.231
The breadth to the Williams standard created by the supreme court
decisions in Smallwood and Bean has caused inconsistency amongst
lower courts. 2 2 The Bean and Ruiz decisions provide lower courts
with some indication about how to apply Williams to severance
motions. 23 However, lost in the confusion of previous inconsistent
decisions is any definite policy rationale with which to approach the
issue of joinder under section 954.234 The Williams balancing test
becomes nothing but a shell void of substance when the supreme
court can not agree on what combination of judicial economy and
prejudice equals a fair trial.235 Therefore, lower courts are compelled
to keep abreast of the latest definition of Williams. For the time
being, trial courts, prosecutors and defense attorneys should not rely
of killing combined with unknown ones are of an "inflammatory nature". See People v.Williams, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 452, 683 P.2d 699, 705, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 707 (1984) (inflammatory
crimes are not limited to sex crimes against children or gang membership). See also Bean, 46Cal. 3d at 940-42, 760 P.2d at 1023, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 494. (Broussard, J., dissenting) (the
murders were very inflammatory).
229. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 933, 760 P.2d at 1008, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
230. Id. at 933, 760 P.2d at 1008, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
231. Id. Although admittedly, trial courts' factual determinations are not often upset by aless well informed review court, (absent a clear abuse of discretion) there would appear to be
a great danger in this general rule when the standard itself is in such confusion. See Newmanv. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 377, 385, 224 Cal. Rptr. 538, 543 (1986). The defendantis entirely at the mercy of the particular understanding of Williams balancing test. Id. Thedegree of deference given the trial court's findings by the Bean court, and its apparent roteapplication of the Williams criteria without particular scrutiny, confirms the worst fears ofone justice. See Id. at 385, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 543 (1986) (Poche, J., concurring). "[N]o longerwill trial court decisions on severance be subject to any serious appellate review . .. Suchdecisions will be upheld on the basis of boilerplate paragraphs. . What is forseeable is thatthe defendant will be convicted on both crimes so long as the evidence on one is convincing".
(emphasis added) Id.
232. See supra note 199 (conflicting opinions amongst District Courts of Appeals).233. See infra notes 237-56 and accompanying text (discussion of "Bean standard").
234. See Joint and Single Trials, supra note 42 at 553 (1965) (advocates limiting joinderunder federal joinder statutes to crimes that are cross-admissible). See also supra notes 148-231 and accompanying text (courts since Williams seem to have come no closer to definingwhose interest, the defendant's or the state's, is being sought to be protected or furthered
with the Williams balancing test; one must inquire as to whether economic benefits can be
balanced against prejudice at all).
235. See generally People v. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 760 P.2d 996, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467(1988); People v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 722 P.2d 197, 228 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1986) (bothcases allegedly fit within the framework of Williams balancing test, yet incorporate entirely
different judicial philosophies).
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on Williams, but the Bean standard in addressing severance issues.
236
V. THE Bean STANDARD
A. Cross-admissibility
Lower courts must first consider cross-admissibility.?
7 Under Wil-
liams, if the charges are cross-admissible, joinder under section 954
will be proper per se. 38 However, a finding of noncross-admissibility
has carried little weight in determining prejudice in the Lucas court
decisions handed down so far.? 9 The court rationalizes that any
prejudice in joining noncross-admissible crimes is offset by some
presumed benefits of joinder, absent other strong prejudicial circum-
stances.Y Following a finding of noncross-admissibility, lower courts
should consider the additional benefits and prejudices laid out by
Williams.'
41
B. Benefits of Joinder
Based on Lucas court decisions to date, lower courts may give
great weight to the judicial economy realized merely by virtue of
consolidating two trials.242 Unlike the economy in avoiding duplicative
evidence, that varies drastically with each case, the benefit recognized
236. See infra notes 237-54 and accompanying text. The "Bean standard" is the name
given by the author to the Lucas court's interpretation of the Williams standard thus far.
237. See Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 451, 683 P.2d 699, 705, 204 Cal.
Rptr. 700, 706. (1984) (determine cross-admissibility first because it is decisive).
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., People v. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 760 P.2d 996, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1988);
People v. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d 489, 749 P.2d 854, 244 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1988); People v. Odle, 45
Cal. 3d 386, 754 P.2d 184, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1988); People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 753
P.2d 1082, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988) (in all of these decisions, the court has minimized the
importance of cross-admissibility as a vital factor in prejudicial joinder). Cf. People v. Johnson,
43 Cal. 3d 296, 313-18 730 P.2d 131, 145-55, 233 Cal. Rptr. 562, 576-86 (1987) (Bird, C.J.,
concurring); People v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 424-33, 722 P.2d at 197, 202-09, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 913, 918-25 (1986) (cases in which the pivotal nature of cross-admissibility is stressed).
240. See, e.g., Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 933, 760 P.2d at 1008, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
241. See Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 447-54, 683 P.2d at 701-07, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 702-08
(Williams balancing test).
242. See Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 933, 760 P.2d at 1008, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 479 (benefit derived
by virtue of a single jury and courtroom). This economic benefit is not very significant. See
Joint and Single Trials, supra, note 42 at 560 (savings minimal because trial lasts much longer
when unrelated charges are joined).
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by the present supreme court is a constant. 4 3 Therefore, lower courts
may consider this presumed benefit of joinder a legitimate benefit
that must always be offset by additional prejudice. 4 Under Bird
court interpretations of Williams', only a state interest in avoiding
substantial duplication of evidence was considered a legitimate benefit
of joinder.245 As yet, the Lucas court has reviewed no noncross-
admissible case under section 954 in which the facts showed any
duplicative evidence. However, if that situation arises, joinder will
probably be unassailable. 24 6
C. Capital Crimes
In Bean, the court was silent as to the capital nature of the charges
before it and the resulting need for higher scrutiny. 247 After Ruiz,
however, lower courts can refrain from giving capital crimes weight
in determining prejudice unless two non-capital cases would become
capital by virtue of joinder.2  Should that situation arise, the lower
courts may find joinder substantially prejudicial under section 954,
but probably only if other prejudicial circumstances are present.249
D. Other Prejudicial Circumstances
Lower courts may direct limited attention to the final two deter-
minants of prejudice in the Williams balancing test, cases which are
of an inflammatory nature and trials combining multiple weak cases
or strong with weak cases2 0 So far, the court has limited the term
243. Joint and Single Trials, supra, note 42 at 560-62.
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., People v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 425-27, 722 P.2d 197, 203-4, 228Cal. Rptr. 913, 919-20 (1986) (benefits of joinder will not accrue in every case and may not
be presumed).
246. See Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 933-37, 760 P.2d 1006-09, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 477-80 (even
when the joined crimes had no overlapping evidence that would promote judicial economy
from joinder, the supreme court upheld the trial court's denial of severance, and in the face
of additional prejudice under Coleman).
247. Id. at 133-34, 760 P.2d at 1008, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 479 (1988).
248. See People v. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d 589, 606, 749 P.2d 854, 862, 244 Cal. Rptr. 200, 208
(heightened scrutiny required when capital crimes are involved only if joinder converts otherwise
non-capital crimes into a capital one because of special circumstances).
249. See Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d at 435, 722 P.2d at 209, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 925 (Lucas,
J., dissenting) (section 954 does not differentiate between capital and non-capital offenses, so
neither should the court).
250. See, e.g., Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 929-32, 760 P.2d at 1005-09, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 476-80.
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inflammatory to the specific facts of Williams and Coleman, situa-
tions in which gang warfare is a common characteristic of joined
crimes or in which one of several joined crimes involves sex crimes
against children.2 1 Further, the Bean court considered joined charges
inflammatory only in relation to each other, not inherently so.2s2
However, since both Williams and Coleman involved situations cre-
ating strong public outcry, circumstances with a similar impact on
juries might also qualify as inflammatory. 213 With respect to joinder
of strong and weak cases, the court has indicated a willingness to




The Bean standard gives great weight to presumed benefits of
joinder and approaches the issue of prejudice under section 954 in
the pre Williams fashion of virtual disregard.2 55 This attitude, coupled
with the fact that the Lucas court has so far exhibited a great
unwillingness to meddle with trial court severance decisions, suggests
that trial courts applying the Bean court's interpretation of Williams
can feel quite safe in denying most severance motions.2 6 Conversely,
trial courts that are more sympathetic to the Williams analysis applied
in People v. Smallwood may feel equally safe in granting severance
motions.2 7
The Bean standard rests on a weak foundation, both in logic and
fairness.25 Joinder of noncross-admissible charges is contrary to
251. See e.g., Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 607, 749 P.2d at 862, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 208. The court
in Ruiz also implied that particularly brutal or repulsive crimes under the standard set forth
in Balderas also might be considered inflammatory. Id. See also Coleman v. Superior Court,
116 Cal. App. 3d 129, 138, 172 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91 (1981) (sex crimes against children). Williams
v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 452-53, 683 P.2d 699, 706, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 707 (1984)
(gang membership).
252. See Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 933-34, 760 P.2d at 1008, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
253. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 43 Cal. 3d 296, 305-07, 730 P.2d 131, 138-39, 233 Cal.
Rptr. 562, 569-70 (1987) (court thought rape of white woman by black man in a church might
be sufficiently inflammatory).
254. See, e.g., Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 931-33, 760 P.2d at 1006, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 477 (1988).
255. See supra notes 237-54 and accompanying text (Bean standard) Cf. People v. Matson,
13 Cal. 3d 35, 41, 528 P.2d 752, 755, 117 Cal. Rptr. 664, 667 (1974) ("[w]here consolidation
meets the test of joinder, the difficulty of showing prejudice from denial of severance is so
great that courts invariably reject the claim of abuse of discretion").
256. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 930, 760 P.2d at 1006, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
257. Id.
258. Id. Without demonstrating real economic benefits from joinder, which would avoid
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notions of fairness adhered to by Evidence Code section 1101(b). 259
Under the Bird court, the practice was justified only when the balance
tipped in favor of substantial and real economic benefits to the
state.260 Joinder of charges sharing no evidence produces a savings
of public resources, but failure to join them does not amount to a
waste of public funds.261 Public funds are wasted only when charges
involving the same general facts and no great prejudice to the
defendant are nevertheless tried separately. 262 If our society considered
all single trials a waste of public funds when compared with a joint
trial, society would merely save money by joining unrelated charges
duplicative evidence, the Williams court's basic theory behind Matson has not been applied.
Matson, 13 Cal. 3d at 41, 528 P.2d at 759, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 668. Thus, there is no legitimate
state interest in prejudicing the defendant by joining noncross-admissible charges. See People
v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 431, 722 P.2d 197, 207, 228 Cal. Rptr. 913, 923. (1986) ("The
only real convenience served by permitting a joint trial of unrelated charges is the convenience
of the prosecution in securing a conviction."). The Lucas court view is also in the minority
nationally. See LAFAvE, supra, note 22 at 659 (only one third of the states have joinder
provisions which, like section 954, allow joinder of crimes that are not part of a single criminal
transaction or cross-admissible). The majority of other states' joinder statutes, as well as the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are applied with much greater sensitivity to prejudice
from joinder than is section 954 under the Lucas court analysis. Id. See also, Chambers v.
U.S. 301 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (joinder of noncross-admissible charges violates Rule 14
of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir.
1964) (defendant substantially prejudiced by possibility of spillover of evidence from one
charge to the other); Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (joinder depends
mainly on cross-admissibility between joined charges).
On the subject of logic, the reader should also note that, as a rule, the California Supreme
Court has been quite strict in its application of Evidence Code section 1101(b), despite its
changing view on the importance of cross-admissibility in proper joinder under section 954.
From Williams to date, the California Supreme Court has reversed the trial court's decision
on cross-admissibility in virtually all section 954 death penalty cases. See, e.g., Williams v.
Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 683 P.2d 699, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1984); People v. Smallwood,
42 Cal. 3d 415, 722 P.2d 197, 228 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1986); People v. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919,
760 P.2d 996, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1988); People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 711 P.2d 480,
222 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1985); People v. Johnson, 43 Cal. 3d 296, 730 P.2d 131, 233 Cal. Rptr.
562(1987). There are a few exceptions. See, e.g., People v. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d 589, 749 P.2d
854, 244 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1988); People v. Ghent, Jr., 43 Cal. 3d 739, 739 P.2d 1250, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 82. (1987). Paradoxically, during the same period, the supreme court has allowed the
same prejudice to occur by upholding joinder under section 954 of those noncross-admissible
charges. See, e.g., Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 760 P.2d 996, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467.
259. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (joinder of noncross-admissible crimes
permits jury to hear evidence of one crime in the trial of another when that same evidence
wuold be barred by restrictions in the Evidence Code).
260. See, e.g., Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d at 425, 722 P.2d at 203, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 919 (state
may not presume benefits from joinder).
261. Compare Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 451, 683 P.2d 699, 706, 204
Cal. Rptr. 700, 707 (1984) (there is always economy in a joint trial, but unless there is
substantial duplication of evidence between charges, defendant is being denied right to a fair
trial) with People v. Matson, 12 Cal. 3d 35, 41, 528 P.2d 752, 756, 117 Cal. Rptr. 664, 668
(1974) (waste of public funds occurs only when the same general facts are tried twice).
262. See, e.g., People v. Brock, 66 Cal. 2d 645, 655, 426 P.2d 889, 895, 58 Cal. Rptr.
321, 327 (1967) (crimes which are cross-admissible or part of the same transaction).
1274
1989 / California Penal Code Section 954
and defendants to a point of diminishing economic returns and have
all charges decided by one jury. Fortunately, our society considers
avoiding the danger of improper character inferences and confusion
of evidence that accompanies joint trials worth the extra money spent
trying unrelated charges separately.263 The exception to this general
rule supplied by section 954 should be applied fairly and consistently.
For this to be possible, legislative reform of section 954 is essential. 264
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF PENAL CODE
SECTION 954
A. Section 954 (amended)
Williams imposed a judicial limitation on the definition of charges
that may be joined under section 954.m However, the Williams
standard has not effectively dealt with the court's original concern
over prejudice to the defendant. 26 Penal Code section 954 should be
amended to deal with prejudicial joinder more effectively. Section
954 should conform to the safeguards against prejudice under section
1101 of the Evidence Code while recognizing a legislative intent in
judicial economy. 267
263. See generally Comment, Joint and Single Trials, supra note 42 at 553; Payne, Limiting
Instructions in Joint Criminal Trials, 22 NVAsH. & LEE L. REv. 285 (1965).
264. See infra notes 265-80 and accompanying text (proposed legislative reform of California
Penal Code section 954).
265. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 457, 683 P.2d at 709, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 710 (Goldstein, J.,
dissenting). See supra notes 71-140 and accompanying text (in depth analysis of Williams).
Before Williams, the supreme court predicated improper joinder on the "types" of crimes
joined and whether or not they were in the same class. See e.g. People v. Renier, 148 Cal.
2d 516, 306 P.2d 917 (1957) (all crimes assaultive in nature could be joined). Further, courts
took the view that satisfaction of the joinder provision of section of 954 rendered any claim
of prejudice moot. People v. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d 35, 528 P.2d 752, 117 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1974);
Walker v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 938, 112 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1974). Williams, on the other
hand, revolutionized how section 954 was interpreted. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 451, 683 P.2d
699, 706, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 707. Economic benefits were not, as the supreme court had
previously held, present whenever crimes met the broad joinder criteria of section 954. Id.
Instead, the benefits and prejudice from joinder under section 954 vary with each case and its
particular facts. Id. Cf. Kidwell v. U.S., 38 App. D.C. 566, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1912) (early federal
decision recognizing that crimes joined as "of the same class" may actually produce no
economic benefits, while subjecting the defendant to great prejudice).
266. See Newman v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 377, 385, 224 Cal. Rptr. 538, 543.
(Poche, J., concurring) (Williams is not a usable standard).
267. See B. WrrKw, CALomRN-A PROCEDURE, 288 (2d ed 1985) (the requirements of
similarity that apply to the admission of evidence of uncharged offenses are not applicable
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Cross-admissibility between joined charges should create a pre-
sumption of proper joinder under section 954.26 Moreover, if joined
charges are cross-admissible, the burden should be on the defendant
to show substantial prejudice under Evidence Code section 352 in
order to sever.269 Noncross-admissibility between joined charges should
create a presumption of substantial prejudice to the defendant, which
the prosecution can rebut by satisfying two conditions: (1) the crimes
are all part of a single criminal transaction; and (2) no particularly
prejudicial circumstances exist such as those originally classified in
Coleman.270 As a result, section 954 should read as follows:
(1) The court, in its discretion, may order or allow one or more
charges to be joined for a single trial in the interests of judicial
economy provided that:
(a) if the charges were to be tried separately, evidence of each
charge would be admissible in the trial of the other[s] under Evidence
Code sections 1101(b) and 352, or
(b) all charges joined are part of the same criminal transaction,
and the economic benefit from their joinder substantially outweighs
the danger of prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice from joinder
includes but is not limited to: crimes reasonably likely to inflame a
jury, crimes of different strengths, and any crime involving the
when all offenses are charged). But judicial economy should be contingent on the degree to
which joined charges have overlapping evidence and even then, the defendant's right to a fair
trial should never be compromised. People v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 426, 722 P.2d 197,
203, 228 Cal. Rptr. 913, 919 (1986); Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 451, 683
P.2d 699, 706, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 707 (1984).
268. Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 448, 683 P.2d at 703, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 704 (evidence which
is already admissible to prove a disputed fact under Evidence Code section 1101(b) has already
been held more probative than prejudicial under the restrictions imposed by the code). The
evidence, when joined, also promotes maximum judicial economy because in separate trials of
the crimes, if severed, evidence of each crime would nevertheless have to be introduced in a
separate trial of the other[s]. LAFAvE, supra note 22 at 658-61.
269. See JEFFMaSON, supra note 37 at 1201-05. The trial judge determines whether other
crimes' evidence will be admitted under Evidence Code section 1101(b) Id. If evidence of other
crimes is admissible under an 1101(b) theory and therefore cross-admissible for purposes of
Penal Code section 954, the defendant moving for severance under section 954 should have
the same burden that a defendant has under Evidence Code section 1101(b) if the defendant
wishes to have evidence excluded on the ground of prejudice. Id. To exclude evidence that is
otherwise admissible under section 1101(b), a defendant must satisfy trial court that danger of
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. Id.
270. Id. Violations of notions of fairness embodied in Evidence Code sections 1101(a) and
(b), should only be allowed upon a showing of a compelling state interest in promoting judicial
economy. People v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d at 415, 426, 722 P.2d 197, 203, 228 Cal. Rptr.
913, 919 (noncross-admissibility automatically subjects a defendant to additional prejudice
upon joinder). On the other hand, when joined charges are part of a single transaction, even
if not cross-admissible, economic benefits are usually great because of contemporaneity of
charges in geography and time, while prejudice is minimal due to small liklelihood of error
with respect to defendant's identity. Joint & Single Trials, supra note 42 at 556-60.
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possibility of a death sentence.
(2) A defendant charged with multiple offenses shall be entitled
to a joint trial of the offenses to the extent reasonable.
B. Interpretive Comments
With the above wording, the amended statute recognizes the eco-
nomic benefits of a joint trial in which all crimes are charged, by
permitting joinder of noncross-admissible charges which are part of
the same transaction. 271 At the same time, multiple offenses that are
not cross-admissible at the time of trial are presumed non-joinable
because of the great danger of prejudice to the defendant.
272 When-
ever a jury hears evidence of two or more crimes at the same time,
it will draw some extra-evidentiary inference of guilt.273 Moreover,
Evidence Code section 1101(b) considers evidence of uncharged crimes
relevant only if the prosecution proves by at least a preponderance
of the evidence the defendant's commission of the uncharged crime. 274
Beyond this level of proof, the uncharged crime's evidence will still
be excluded if it creates a danger of undue prejudice under Evidence
271. See People v. Shells, 4 Cal. 3d 626, 632, 483 P.2d 1227, 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 275,
279 (1971); People v. Haston, 69 Cal. 2d 233, 244-50, 444 P.2d 91, 99-102, 70 Cal. Rptr.
419, 427-30 (1968) (same benefits do not exist when the state merely seeks to introduce evidence
of uncharged crimes for purposes of resolving a fact in dispute as are present when all crimes
are charged). However, noncross-admissible joinder should be limited to crimes that are part
of single transaction, because most crimes having any significant amount of overlapping
evidence so as to produce legitimate economic benefit from joinder are either cross-admissible
or are part of the same transaction. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (crimes connected
in their commission); Joint and Single Trials, supra note 42 at 556-560. Even if the crimes
have overlapping evidence, they should be excluded as a matter of law if they are not either
cross-admissible or part of the same transaction because of the potential for abuse of what
would otherwise be a discretionary rule. See, e.g., Newman v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App.
3d 377, 224 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1988) (stretched Balderas to fit a fact situation where joined
charges shared absolutely no evidence that would the state's compelling interest in judicial
economy); People v. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 760 P.2d 996, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1988) (claims
to be applying Williams but crimes shared no overlapping evidence necessary under Williams
to satisfy Matson exception).
272. See Williams 36 Cal. 3d at 448-49, 683 P.2d at 703, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 704 (judicial
economy must never overide defendant's right to a fair trial); People v. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d
761, 772, 457 P.2d, 841, 852, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1, 12 (1969) ("[t]he risk of convicting the innocent
is sufficiently imminent for us to forego the slight marginal gain in punishing the guilty.").
273. JEFmERSON, supra note 37 at 262 (admission of evidence of other crimes produces an
overstrong tendancy to believe the defendant guilty of the charge merely because he is the
likely person to do such acts). Also, the jury might not be able to identify with a defendant
of offensive character, hence would tend to disbelieve the evidence in his favor. Note,
Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant-a Reevaluation of the Privilege Against
Self-incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of the Propensity to Commit Other Crimes,
78 HARv. L. Rv. 426, 436 (1964).
274. JEmsRsoN, supra note 37 at 1201.
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Code section 352.275 In contrast, joinder of noncross-admissible charges
allows a jury to be influenced in its decision concerning one charge
by evidence of other charges which is quite possibly wholly irrele-
vant.276 Finally, when crimes are not cross-admissible or part of the
same transaction they should not be joined at all, because judicial
economy is at a minimum; the evidence from one crime would not
be admissible in a separate trial of the other[s], and there will most
often be little duplication of evidence. 277
The proposed statute would subject joinder of noncross-admissible
charges to a high level of scrutiny. The burden of proving high
economic value and low prejudice rests with the prosecution. Because
of the discretionary nature of weighing economic value against prej-
udice, the process is susceptible to grave abuse by trial court judges. 278
Therefore, putting the burden on the state and allowing errors to
fall in favor of the defendant would be fairer.279 Proper joinder
should be conditioned on fairness. Moreover, fairness should be
defined by the statute. If fairness can be acheived at all through a
formula that justifies a certain amount of prejudice in exchange for
economic savings to the state, the formula should be clearly defined
and strictly adhered to.
VII. CONCLUSION
At present, section 954 serves the purpose of allowing joinder of
multiple criminal charges for the sake of judicial economy, but at
the expense of a fair trial. The purpose of section 954 is not to make
convictions easier for the prosecution, although that has been the
result. 20 In considering severance motions, courts have struggled with
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text (close connection necessary between
crimes before real benefits of joinder will be realized).
278. See People v. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 937, 760 P.2d 996, 1022, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467,
493 (1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting) (vigorous disagreement with majority decision to affirm
trial court's finding on issues of relative strengths of joined charges, and inflammatory nature
of crimes). The tendancy of review courts to uphold all findings of fact by trial courts would
seem to compound the problem when the balancing of economic benefits against prejudice is
discretionary, based entirely upon facts. See Newman v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d
377, 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 538, 543 (1986) (Poche, J., concurring) (denials of severance motions
will be upheld on the basis of boilerplate paragraphs).
279. Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 448, 683 P.2d 699, 703, 204 Cal. Rptr.
700, 704. (1984).
280. See People v. Smallwood, 42 Cal. 3d 415, 430, 722 P.2d 197, 207, 228 Cal. Rptr.
913, 923 (1986) (only beneficiary of joint trial of unrelated charges is the prosecutor who
enjoys the convenience of easier convictions).
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finding an appropriate standard by which to balance the benefits of
joinder against the possibility of prejudice. Interpretations of section
954 have varied to the point that the statute is not a creation of the
legislature, but of the courts. The latest interpretation given the
statute by the Lucas court endangers defendants' rights and disregards
one of the statute's objectives-fairness. The legislature should limit
the court's freedom to adopt its own view of fairness under section
954 by amending the statute to ensure that judicial economy and
surer convictions are not gained at the expense of defendants' rights
to a fair trial.
Mark R. McDonald
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